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Happy new year to everyone, wherever you may be. This past year has brought 
a lot of changes to the Combating Terrorism Exchange in terms of design and 
distribution, as we continue to refine and improve it. We hope you’re enjoying 
the journal’s new look. Besides changes to the graphics and layout, the biggest 
change, of course, is having current and past issues of the journal available for 
reading or download on our website, www.GlobalECCO.org. 
This issue brings you an eclectic collection of essays and columns from authors 
around the world, on a variety of CT-related topics. If there is a theme to the 
group, you might call it “soul searching.” Twelve years after the United States 
began what was then termed the “War on Terror,” troop levels in Afghanistan 
are gradually declining ahead of the proposed 2014 deadline for withdrawal. 
Several of the authors look back and think about what we have, and have not, 
learned from these difficult years of fighting.
MAJ Sándor Fábián of the Hungarian SOF starts with a hard look at the way 
the allies are preparing Afghan Defense Forces to stand up on their own against 
the Taliban. Why, he wonders, are we trying to duplicate a Western-style 
conventional force in a rural, tribally based country, with troops whose entire 
military culture has evolved around highly effective irregular warfare? In answer, 
he proposes a force structure for the Afghans that capitalizes on their historic 
strengths and borrows from the enemy’s strike-and-run tactics. Doug Borer and 
Jason Morrissette then shine a light on events in Mali, once one of Africa’s most 
stable democracies and now torn by violent Islamist insurgencies dominating 
the desert north, and a feckless military junta trying to keep its grip in the more 
prosperous south. The authors describe how short-sighted and often corrupt 
government policies are turning wide swathes of ancestral farmland over to 
multinational corporations for export crops, and transforming countless vil-
lages of peaceful farmers into angry, rebellious mobs primed for radicalization. 
Our rhetoric about war has changed over the past decade as well, and Gaute 
Solheim draws on Norway’s experience in World War II to explain why this 
has not been for the better. What generals and politicians like to call COIN, 
he reminds us with dry wit, is what previous generations called occupation, 
and we should be aligning our strategies accordingly. Bob Miske follows with 
a synopsis of a master’s thesis he wrote with partner Srinivas Ganapathiraju, 
in which, similar to Sándor Fábián, they question the wisdom of trying to fit 
a centralized, Western-style government structure to a highly factionalized 
post-conflict society like Afghanistan’s or Iraq’s. The successful decentralized 
democracy of fractious India, they suggest, could serve as a useful model for 
pulling divided countries together.
The Counter-Terrorism Archive Project, a key part of the Global ECCO group 
that includes this journal, collects interviews with CT operators, who recount 
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their experiences in the field for the benefit of their peers. Katherine Ellena and Rebecca Lorentz of CTAP draw on the 
lessons learned by an American and a Norwegian officer in Afghanistan to discuss the roles that cultural and language 
training play in CT and peace-building operations. An open mind, they deduce, can be more useful to cross-cultural 
understanding than intensive study. Next, Amina Kator-Mubarez shows us the damage that harsh Islamist-backed 
blasphemy laws are doing to Pakistan’s fragile multi-ethnic society, where an open mind often invites death threats. 
She warns that Pakistan’s ascendant extremists continue to both influence and support Afghanistan’s Taliban, while at 
the same time further alienate Pakistan’s dwindling roster of allies. 
Bringing to a close this thoughtful group of articles, Victor Asal and Steve Sin offer a short primer on why people 
rebel. As Borer and Morrissette observed, grievance is the underlying condition, but is that enough to bring ordinary 
people to risk their lives against their (typically) better armed tormentors? Asal and Sin offer evidence that to catalyze 
rebellion, grievance must have opportunity, and rebels must have resources.1
We welcome several new contributors to our regular columns. First, Andrew Ely, a lieutenant commander in the U.S. 
Coast Guard and assistant professor at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, uses the Ethics and Insights column to raise 
the subject of obligation as it relates to our personal lives, and more importantly, to the lives of those in uniform. When 
enlisted or commissioned personnel swear to uphold the duties and obligations of the service, is there an expiration 
date to that oath? If the security of the country might be put at risk through word or deed, LCDR Ely concludes, the 
answer has to be no.
Next, we are fortunate to have not one, but two Moving Image columns. So butter the popcorn and get ready for a 
couple of rainy weekends’ CT-style entertainment! First, John Arquilla reminds us that the U.S.-British TV mini-series 
The Grid, which ran in 2004, not only preceded Zero Dark Thirty, but at four and a half hours of running time, easily 
outstrips the new film in terms of edge-of-your-chair realism and depth. As recent history and this series make all too 
clear, anyone can exploit a network. Nils French then draws us back in time to the height of the Nazi occupation of 
Europe with a couple of recent films, one French and one Danish. While collaborators in both countries willingly 
turned their governments over to the enemy for a chance to wallow in power, these two films tell about the men and 
women who risked their lives to resist in any way they could. The French Resistance is famous, but much less is known 
about the Danes’ struggle to undermine the Nazi puppet regime. (Here’s your chance to learn how the word “quisling” 
came to signify a traitor.)
Srinivas Ganapathiraju supplies our book review, with a discussion of The Politics of Counterterrorism in India by Prem 
Mahadevan. Despite its remarkable plethora of indigenous ethnic groups, languages, and religions, India has managed 
to remain an impressively stable, relatively functional democracy since independence in 1948. At the same time, many 
Indian states have been chronically plagued by insurgencies and terrorism. Ganapathiraju, a group captain in the 
Indian Air Force, not only describes Mahadevan’s analysis of Indian CT policies, but gives us the operator-eye view of  
New Delhi’s dilemmas.
We close once again with the occasional column State of the Art, our forum for creative and/or off-the-wall discus-
sions of this “interesting” world we find ourselves in. Contributor Rachel Davis returns with a sharp-eyed look at the 
9/11 Memorial website, ostensibly a forum for educating young teenagers about the tragedy that took place a little over 
a decade ago. She minutely dissects the website’s pop-culture sensibility, and delves deeply into the layers of innuendo 
that perhaps inevitably leave the reader with far more questions than the website’s authors ever thought to answer.
As always, we’ve got several publications announcements for you to check out, including two studies from JSOU and a 
new book by Dr. Shanthie D’Souza. Thanks for reading the CTX, and please, send us your stuff! May the coming year 
bring you prosperity, and, at long last, peace.
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor
1 These findings are echoed in Rob Schroeder, Sean Everton, and Russell Shepherd, “Mining Twitter Data from the Arab Spring,” CTX vol. 2, 
no. 4 (November 2012). The authors describe their original research showing that Egyptian activists were able to frame grievances and thus 
organize a movement using the Twitter social network.
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Multinational service members with Maimanah Provincial Reconstruction 
Team, Regional Command North secure an area during Operation Wahadat 
in Faryab province, Afghanistan, April 12, 2011. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. 
Caroline Lunde/Released)
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About the Contributors
After a decade of vigorous fighting in Afghanistan, the United 
States and its allies are beginning to understand that a conventional battle-
field military strategy, conducted by traditionally organized, trained, and 
equipped forces, does not work against a determined irregular adversary. With 
nearly 3,000 dead and tens of thousands of casualties, the allies have started 
to shift their main effort from conventional operations to unorthodox ways 
of doing business. Allied leaders seem finally to recognize the key points of 
Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s theory of asymmetric conflict, and have decided to use 
an indirect strategy to counter the enemy’s irregular tactics.2 Even though 
NATO is starting to use non-traditional forces to enhance the Afghan military’s 
capabilities, however, we are still misreading the lessons of history by trying to 
fit a conventional military organization to a problem it was not designed for.
This article suggests that Afghan and allied leaders replace both the conven-
tional military force structure and their plans for local irregular militias with a 
defensive strategy built around non-traditional organizational and operational 
principles. The goal would be to transform the entire Afghan Security Forces 
into a full-time, professional irregular force. This proposal is based on three 
assumptions about how a small country (in terms of population and economic 
power)3 may best defend itself against a stronger irregular or conventional enemy:
1. A small state with limited resources can more easily afford effective 
professional irregular forces than conventional forces; 
2. a small state has a better chance to defeat its enemies by using irregular 
warfare techniques rather than traditional military approaches; 
3. such a strategy will be more effective when the irregular force is profes-
sional and its members have been trained and equipped for irregular 
warfare before conflict begins, rather than in response to a conflict that 
is underway.
Structural changes in most countries’ military forces have always come from 
the lessons learned from their own and their enemies’ experiences, yet it seems 
that in Afghanistan we have forgotten the latter. Despite the fact that Western 
allies adopted so many organizational and operational principles from Napo-
leon’s Grand Armée, the Germans in World War II, and later from the Soviet 
Union, it seems we are not willing to learn the same lessons from our “new” 
irregular enemies. Instead of building an organization capable of answering 
the irregular threat by implementing the structural and operational advantages 
of our enemies, the planners of the new Afghan Security Forces are relying 
on familiar, old-fashioned, massed conventional force structure, training, 
and equipment. We are developing a military that looks similar to ours in an 
environment that completely lacks the fundamental principles of Western-
style military culture. 
We need to change this mindset. The current plan calls for an Afghan Se-
curity Force of about 350,000 men to ensure the country’s security after the 
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departure of allied forces in 2014. The Afghan army and air force are organized 
into battalions (kandaks), brigades, and corps, equipped primarily with 
traditional U.S. and European weapon-systems, and trained according to U.S. 
military doctrine.4 If we really want to answer the insurgents’ indirect strategy 
with our own, however, then we need an organization built, trained, and 
equipped to fight irregular wars. 
This may not be as difficult as it sounds, because throughout history the 
Afghan warriors have proven themselves to be vicious fighters, with remarkable 
skill in irregular warfare—of which allied forces have acquired firsthand experi-
ence. Through familiarity with their homeland, resilience in the most difficult 
physical conditions, and the ability to adapt to the tactics and strategies of dif-
ferent enemies, the Afghan fighters have repeatedly demonstrated their strength 
against some of the mightiest military powers in the world. As we build the 
future Afghan military, we should be learning lessons from the organizational 
structure and military operations of the insurgents of Afghanistan, as well as 
other irregular forces throughout history. We all have seen how effective the 
Balkan partisans, the Chechen militias, and Hezbollah were with a handful of 
fighters, ad hoc organizations, and limited supplies.5 Imagine how effective these 
organizations could have been if they had been elevated to the state level, with 
full national economic, informational, and infrastructural support. Instead of 
forcing our traditional approach on the Afghans, why do we not capitalize on 
these same principles of irregular warfare, but on a different, national level? 
Structure and Training
One of the most import elements of our present conventional strategy (and 
the one we are preparing for our Afghan partners as well) is to hold onto 
the territories we already own or have taken from the enemy. We are trying 
to gain control of the vast Afghan countryside through the establishment of 
large conventional bases and forward operational bases and outposts, from 
which we launch operations. Since this approach and our conventional force 
structure do not allow our forces to maintain a continuous presence in the 
countryside, the strategy has shown limited success. Without the presence of 
NATO and Afghan forces, the insurgents prosper in these rural areas, and have 
had remarkable success in establishing a shadow government in the districts 
they occupy. To change this situation in our favor, we need to change our ap-
proach and build a force really capable of controlling territories. The proposed 
irregular force would be much smaller (about 100,000 men) than the cur-
rently existing one, but it has to be a select, high-quality force. 
To be effective both in the current unconventional environment and in a 
possible future conventional conflict in defense of Afghanistan, the new 
force should be organized and trained along the lines of John Arquilla’s and 
David Ronfeldt’s battleswarm theory.6 According to this theory, the new 
Afghan Defense Forces must be a network-like organization with a unified 
command and control element that sets strategic goals, but that intervenes 
in the operations of the subordinate elements only when it is strictly neces-
sary. The main body of the defense forces would consist of a large number of 
small units (fighting cells of 30–40 men) capable of operating autonomously 
in their respective areas of operations by following mission-type orders. 
These individual units would also be capable of conducting operations 
as part of a larger formation (for example, as a designated quick-reaction 
If we really want to answer the 
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force). The locally recruited and deployed units must possess a mixed set of 
capabilities, including, at a minimum, an infantry assault force, engineering 
skills, explosive ordnance disposal, long-range communications, information 
collection and processing, and enhanced medical skills. 
How would this force structure be better than the conventional forces? The 
small size of the proposed units and their enabling capabilities would have two 
major advantages over the insurgents or against a future conventional force. 
First, having only a small footprint and the ability to operate with limited re-
supply would eliminate the large conventional units’ current disadvantages of 
being visible and predictable, and thus easily targetable. Second, the sustained 
pulsing and continuous field presence of the numerous small units within 
their respective area of operations would not only keep the enemy off-balance, 
but would more effectively extend and consolidate our territorial control.
The most obvious way to create the proposed force structure is to build it on 
Afghan society’s most defining social structure, that of the tribes. Although 
the idea of Village Support Operations (VSO) indicates the allies are starting 
to capitalize on local militias, these groups’ questionable effectiveness makes 
it necessary to take this approach to a different level. The locally recruited 
guerrilla fighters have to become professional soldiers who are organized, 
trained, and equipped to fight irregular wars. The small, localized units 
would operate in their home area, the place they know best and where their 
own interests lie. 
Because modern warfare goes beyond combat operations into security/stability 
building, the proposed forces have to be able to conduct their missions across 
the entire spectrum of conflicts. On the one hand, these professional irregular 
units have to possess both offensive and defensive swarming capabili-
ties to effectively counter the current insurgent threat. Their mission 
sets must include patrolling, intelligence collection, cordon and search 
operations, raids, ambushes, etc. On the other hand, the new forces also have 
to have the skills to support non-military governmental efforts to mitigate 
those societal problems that insurgents thrive on, 
such as poverty, grievance, and lack of governance. 
Based on these operational requirements, the 
training of the new Afghan forces has to encompass 
a unique combination of skills. They have to be able 
to operate much more like our Special Forces than 
our conventional combat units.
We are currently using our elite forces to train and 
build the Afghan Security Forces along conven-
tional lines to meet traditional infantry standards. 
Let’s be honest: For numerous reasons (lack of 
discipline as we understand it, lack of cohesion, 
high levels of illiteracy, no history of Western-type 
military culture, and so on), we have had limited 
success with this approach. We would do better to 
let the Special Forces do what they do best, which 
would be to reorganize and train the new Afghan 
forces for special tactics, techniques, and procedures 
along the lines of the proposed theory. With the 
The new Afghan Defense 
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new type of training, organization, and 
tactics, the Afghan Security Forces would 
almost instantly take away all of the insur-
gents’ current tactical advantages. 
Equipment
To best exploit the proposed force 
structure and achieve mission success, 
the professional irregular forces need to be 
equipped with light, high-quality weapons 
and communication systems, which should 
allow them to carry out swift and unpredict-
able maneuvers while providing accurate local 
information and fire superiority.7 Instead of 
proposing specific systems, it makes more 
sense to consider several requirements and 
some general frameworks for such systems. 
First and foremost, every piece of gear they 
use has to be locally sustainable. We must 
avoid equipping the Afghan forces with our 
high-tech weapon systems, whose mainte-
nance requirements are so high that only a 
handful of countries can really afford to use 
them. At the small unit level, the equipment 
must facilitate the maximum exploitation of 
battleswarm, and should ensure the ability 
to operate at night and under severe weather 
conditions; conduct long-range observation; 
maintain secure communications; record, 
evaluate, and transfer data at the site; and rely 
on an intel reach-back capability from the field 
to central databases, to name a few basic re-
quirements. At the higher command levels, the 
Afghan forces have to have the capability to 
follow operations in real time, conduct secure 
communication, operate large databases, etc.
This proposed restructuring seems to ask a lot 
from both the allied powers that have been 
bleeding and spending their taxpayers’ money 
in Afghanistan for years, and the Afghan gov-
ernment, which has been trying to establish 
some level of law and order for years as well. 
The proposal not only provides a solution for 
winning the current fight, however, it also 
introduces a valid and sustainable strategic 
approach for Afghanistan’s future defense. For 
those who still have doubts, thinking about 
the answers to the following questions might 
help clarify things: 
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1. Would a professional irregular defense force, using irregular warfare 
tactics, be more effective for answering the current threat than a 
conventional military?
2. Would a professional irregular defense force be better able to protect 
information about itself in the field than our large conventional forma-
tions have?
3. Would the maintenance of the proposed forces be more affordable for 
both the allies and the future Afghan government than the current 
structure?
4. What size of professional, irregular defense force could be sustained 
from the same budget used by the current conventional military?
5. What missions would the proposed forces be unable to conduct, that 
would require conventional forces?
6. How long would it take to transform the current tenuous Afghan 
conventional military culture and organization into a professional 
irregular defense force?
It is time for us to understand that our military organizational and procedural 
designs are not the only ones that can work; there is no “one size fits all” solu-
tion to military requirements. We need to start learning the right lessons, by 
focusing not only on how to exploit our enemies’ weaknesses, but also on how 
to incorporate their organizational and operational strengths into our own and 
our partners’ military systems. This outlook would set us up for success in the 
current conflict more effectively than does our present approach. And it could 
well prepare us for the next military conflict we are likely to fight. 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
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“Professional Irregular Defense Forces: The Other Side of 
COIN,” prepared for the Defense Analysis Department of the 
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“Mali: Islamist Rebels Smash Historic Sufi Tombs” 
New York Times 
Diningareyber Mosque 
Dateline 10 July 2012, Timbuktu, Mali
It is sometimes said that United States military personnel and 
policymakers are more interested in making history than reading it. Due 
to this lack of local knowledge and cultural awareness, many of the United 
States’ modern wars—primarily those unconventional or irregular in nature—
have turned out rather poorly. Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq illustrate this 
point. Of course, the United States’ adversaries in these wars also have 
their blind spots, one of the most egregious of which is demonstrated by 
contemporary militant Islamists, who too often are more interested in 
destroying history—even that of their own culture—than in cherishing it. 
The Taliban’s demolition of 1,500-year-old Buddhist statues in Afghanistan in 
2001 and, more recently, the obliteration of ancient Sufi shrines in Mali by the 
al Qaeda-linked Ansar Dine in 2012, serve as reminders that America’s ten-
dency to underestimate history pales in comparison to the banal intolerance 
many militant Islamist groups express for ideas not their own.
What are the origins of militant Islam in Mali? Was it imported via the 
World Wide Web after 9/11? Was it brought across the border as chaos spread 
through neighboring Libya? Or have the seeds always been present in Mali, 
but lain dormant? Like most countries, Mali’s situation is complicated and 
can be looked at through a variety of lenses. As outsiders peering in from 
afar, we find it useful to consider the recent upswing in political unrest in 
Mali through the lens of economic globalization. Recent research identifies 
three main reasons for the emergence of the militant group Ansar Dine in 
Mali: 1) the diffusion of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) from  
Algeria throughout much of North Africa; 2) the recent civil war in Libya; and 
3) Tuareg tribal politics.1 While we agree with these findings, we suggest that 
the role played by economic policies both inside and outside Mali should not 
be overlooked. In this essay, we will consider how economic decisions made 
by Mali’s government have further destabilized an already struggling country, 
and enhanced the conditions in which a militant group like Ansar Dine can 
survive and thrive. Our basic premise is simple: Mali today illustrates how 
“old” issues of land tenure and food production, the very issues that have 
generated wars throughout the ages, remain important factors to investigate in 
many countries that now face or are likely to face civil unrest or insurgency. 
Political Instability in Mali
The news out of Mali in 2012 has been nothing but bad, and the roots of its 
present discord go back decades. Roughly speaking, the country of Mali  
(1.24 million square miles, or roughly twice the size of Alaska) can be broken 
into two regions: the larger sparsely populated and underdeveloped north, 
Land Grabs, Radicalization, and Political Violence: Lessons from 
Mali and Beyond
Douglas A. Borer,  
Naval Postgraduate School 
Jason J. Morrissette,  
Marshall University
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which is the home of Saharan Tuaregs and Arabs, and the more developed 
south, populated by sub-Saharan Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups. The 
Tuaregs have been in intermittent rebellion against the southern political 
establishment that has controlled Mali since France granted independence in 
1960. The political center in the capital, Bamako, has never fully brought the 
north, referred to as Azawad by Tuaregs, under the authority of the state. 
Recently emboldened by weapons and supplies obtained during the Libyan 
civil war, a new Tuareg paramilitary organization emerged in 2012, the 
National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). While claiming 
secular status, the MNLA quickly aligned itself with the Islamist elements of 
AQIM and Ansar Dine in an effort to expel the government’s military forces 
from the north. Building on a few initial successes, the northern rebellion 
took off when the democratically elected Malian president, Amadou 
Toumani Toure, was overthrown in a surprise military coup in late March 
2012. Led by disgruntled soldiers upset about a lack of support from the 
government, the coup in the south had an immediate impact in the north. 
The Malian soldiers, mostly 
southerners, evacuated the 
three northern regions of Kidal, 
Gao, and Timbuktu (essentially 
two-thirds of the country), thus 
giving the Saharan rebels an easy 
victory. Even as they filled the 
power vacuum, however, the 
rebels soon turned on each other, 
with the Islamist Ansar Dine 
expelling the secular MNLA. 
This marked the beginning of 
the “Talibanization” of northern 
Mali (including the destruction 
of the ancient Sufi tombs noted 
above). By mid-July 2012, the 
MNLA withdrew its demands for 
an independent state and sought 
international assistance to deal 
with Ansar Dine and AQIM.2
While this current Islamist 
power-grab in Mali can be seen 
as the result of a confluence of 
both long-standing grievances 
and shifts in the military bal-
ance of power, the inability of 
the central government to regain control is perhaps surprising. The truth, 
according to U.S. military advisors, is that the Tuaregs and the Islamists in the 
north are exceedingly weak militarily, and they could only have gained control 
as a result of internal discord among the traditional ruling southern elite.3 
Why, after years of democratic and economic stability in southern Mali, did 
the government and military become so ineffective? As political outsiders, we 
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knowledge of the socio-economic origins of conflict in other societies, we 
encourage the reader to consider the following analysis.
The Roots of Discontent
Sub-Saharan Mali is a predominantly rural society, where exported cotton, 
accounting for more than 80 percent of the country’s export revenues, is 
the backbone of the economy. In 2003 President Amadou Toumani Touré 
illustrated the crop’s importance when he co-authored a New York Times op-ed 
with Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaoré, entitled “Your Farm Subsidies 
Are Strangling Us.”4 They described how American farm subsidies, in effect, 
lowered cotton prices on the international market, resulting in a grossly 
unequal status quo in which Malian farmers were paid less than true market 
value for their goods:
In the period from 2001 to 2002, America’s 25,000 cotton farmers 
received more in subsidies—some $3 billion—than the entire eco-
nomic output of Burkina Faso, where two million people depend 
on cotton. Further, United States subsidies are concentrated on 
just 10 percent of its cotton farmers. Thus, the payments to about 
2,500 relatively well-off farmers has the unintended but neverthe-
less real effect of impoverishing some 10 million rural poor people 
in West and Central Africa.5
Their complaints seem plausible, and they echo a common criticism of 
U.S. farm subsidies by the country’s competitors in the global market. To 
make matters worse, long before the military coup in Mali, farmers were 
complaining that government mismanagement was delaying payments for 
their cotton crops until months after the harvest, exposing them to very real 
subsistence pressures. 
Mali’s cotton follies were further heightened in August 2008, when the demo-
cratically elected legislature voted to completely privatize the cotton industry. 
The government divided the state-owned Malian Company for the Develop-
ment of Textiles (CMDT) into four subsidiaries and offered them up for sale, 
breaking its own trade monopoly and fully exposing the country’s farmers to 
international pressures. Reports suggest that by December 2010, the govern-
ment in Bamako had negotiated the lease of 544,500 hectares of Malian land 
to just 22 foreign investment firms, with 40 percent of the land targeted for 
the production of biofuel. In 2011, a Chinese company, the Yuemei Group, 
which owns cotton fields and garment plants elsewhere in Africa, agreed to 
buy two of the CMDT subsidiaries in southern and western Mali. In response, 
southern peasants mobilized against these changes. 
In November 2011, Malian peasants converged on the southern 
village of Nyéléni to protest land sales to foreign interests. Other 
participants came from 30 different countries, speaking to the 
international nature of the threat of land grabs. At the confer-
ence, Ibrahim Coulibaly of the National Confederation of Peasant 
Organizations emphasized the human costs: “We have seen an 
increase in land grabbing. Just in Mali alone the government has 
The government negotiated the 
lease of 544,500 hectares to just 
22 foreign investment firms.
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Self-generated unrest 
eroded the foundations 
of popular sovereignty.
committed to give 800,000 hectares to business investors. But 
these lands are not empty! People may not have legal titles, but 
they have been there for generations, even centuries.”6
A new NGO, the Syndicate of Peasants of Mali, held its first meeting in 
February 2012, when more than 600 peasants gathered in the city of Koutiala 
to express their concerns about privatization and related agricultural poli-
cies. According to Brian Peterson and Brandon County, “Beyond land and 
farming, runaway privatization has made inroads into other sectors of the 
economy: the railroad, the telecommunications company, utilities, gold 
mines, and vegetable oil factories are controlled by private stakeholders with a 
penchant for cost-cutting, producing stagnant wages, discontent, layoffs, and 
protests. But the government has ignored workers’ voices, and labor leaders 
have been dismissed and even imprisoned.”7 In short, self-generated unrest 
eroded the foundations of popular sovereignty.
A Stable Democracy Fails 
In March 2012, when soldiers of the Malian armed forces mutinied, the 
people of Mali largely supported the military’s action, despite the country’s 
long history as a democracy. It would be inaccurate to suggest that a rising 
tide of mass discontent alone sparked the coup; it would not 
be inaccurate, however, to infer that the southern popula-
tion had lost faith in the government and was willing to give 
the soldiers a chance to correct the government’s perceived 
mistakes in the economic arena. The Syndicate of Peasants 
in Mali supported the military junta and asked it to pursue 
four goals: restore the ideals of 1991’s pro-democracy move-
ment; manage the crisis in the country’s north; fight cor-
ruption; and work to restore expropriated lands.8 As of this 
writing, the military regime has yet to make any meaningful 
progress in governance, and as a result, it appears unlikely 
that the change in leadership in the south will significantly 
hinder Ansar Dine in its quest to further reshape northern 
Mali into a Salafi bastion in the heart of West Africa. As 
incidents of sickening juridical brutality, reminiscent of the 
worst years of Taliban rule continue to mount, however, the 
Islamists of Mali may be sowing the seeds of rebellion. But even if their own 
government is too inept to act, many sectors of the civilian population may 
welcome the international intervention that is now being considered by the 
UN Security Council.9
Beyond Mali: A Wider Problem
The Malian government’s land reform policy played what seems to be an 
important role in instigating the political divisions in the south that both 
contributed to the military coup and perpetuated an environment in which 
the Ansar Dine can thrive. These so-called “land grabs” reflect a broader trend, 
whereby states (and states in Africa in particular) seize arable land from local 
farmers—in some cases, hundreds of thousands of hectares at a time—and 
either lease or sell this acreage to foreign investors. In turn, the significant 
populations displaced by these land grabs can become politically volatile. 
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For instance, in Uganda, over 20,000 villagers claim to have been evicted 
from their land.10 This population is ripe for rebellion. In addition, Human 
Rights Watch reported in January 2012 that it has evidence that approximately 
70,000 indigenous people in the western Gambella region of Ethiopia were 
forcibly relocated when the land they lived on was leased to foreign inves-
tors.11 These people are likely to turn against the government. The Oakland 
Institute, a U.S.-based policy think tank, estimates that these land deals have 
displaced perhaps millions of small farmers from their ancestral lands across 
the entire continent of Africa.12 Not only does this displacement undermine 
the livelihoods of millions of Africans, but researchers point out that, in 
Africa, “the close association of land and identity has received much attention. 
Land and natural 
resources are not 
merely assets, 
sources of income, 
and commodi-
ties but represent 
repositories of an-
cestral spirits, sites 
for sacred rituals, 
and historical 
landmarks that tie 
the individual to 
particular locations 
and landscapes.”13 
Taking into account 
both the economic and cultural value of these holdings, governments that 
choose to displace their citizens from their lands by the tens of thousands run 
the risk of creating aggrieved—and potentially volatile—populations that will 
further undermine governmental legitimacy.
With no written documentation to prove they own the land their families 
may have occupied for generations, Neil MacFarquhar describes scenarios in 
which “stunned villagers are discovering that African governments typically 
own their land and have been leasing it, often at bargain prices, to private 
investors and foreign governments for decades to come.”14 Although the oil-
rich Gulf States, intent on securing affordable food for their own populations, 
initially led the land-buying charge, investors from Asia, Europe, and North 
America have increasingly followed suit in anticipation of sizeable returns as 
global food prices continue to soar. Despite local opposition in many states, 
a 2011 World Bank report reveals that these African land grabs represent a 
growing trend since the 2008 global food crisis: 
Compared to an average annual expansion of global agricultural 
land of less than 4 million hectares before 2008, approximately 
56 million hectares worth of large-scale farmland deals were an-
nounced even before the end of 2009. More than 70 percent 
of such demand has been in Africa; countries such as Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, and Sudan have transferred millions of hectares to 
investors in recent years.15
These land deals have displaced 
perhaps millions of small farmers 
from their ancestral lands 
across the continent of Africa.
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In fact, these foreign land deals currently account for 14.6 percent of the total 
agricultural area in Uganda, 21.1 percent in Mozambique, and a staggering 
48.8 percent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.16
Advocates of these land deals insist that they represent a potential windfall for 
African countries that have historically failed to fully capitalize on their own 
agricultural potential. As South African entrepreneur Nissi Ekpott suggests, 
“If land deals are implemented properly, they can bring many benefits to  
Africa—including increased food production, access to improved agro-skills, 
and development in rural communities, which, in turn, will stem the tide of 
urban migration, one of Africa’s most pressing issues.”17 Critics, however, note 
that these develop-
ment opportunities 
are not without their 
costs, costs that his-
torically echo those 
documented during 
the 19th century 
“scramble for Africa,” 
which occurred at the 
zenith of European 
colonialism.18 For 
instance, when land 
previously used for 
subsistence farming 
is leased to foreign 
investors intent on 
exporting agricultural products to wealthier nations, land grabs constitute 
a potential threat to local food supplies. “The food security of the country 
concerned must be first and foremost in everybody’s mind,” insists former 
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. “Otherwise it is straightfor-
ward exploitation and it won’t work.”19
A Harbinger for Africa’s Future?
Mali offers a potentially instructive example of how land grabs in Africa 
can displace large populations, threaten food security as crops are diverted 
to global markets, and increase the likelihood of scarcity-induced resource 
competition. Each of these outcomes, independently or in combination, 
potentially pits societal groups against one another in a struggle for ever-dwin-
dling resources. They also can undermine the legitimacy of those governments 
responsible for signing the land deals, thus increasing the potential for civil 
unrest. In the most grievous cases, these lands deals can spark intrastate vio-
lence, sow the seeds of revolution, and contribute to the further radicalization 
of groups like the Ansar Dine. As this trend becomes increasingly common 
throughout Africa, we suggest that the potential for intrastate and interstate 
violence across the continent significantly increases.
One does not need a doctorate in economics, history, anthropology, or 
political science to understand the possible implications of these types of 
government policies. Both the proponents and critics noted above might in 
fact be correct. If land and agricultural reforms are “done right,” meaning 
These lands deals can spark 
intrastate violence, sow the 




significant numbers of the population benefit, then the use of the phrase 
“land grab” is probably specious. If, however, land and agricultural reforms are 
“done wrong,” meaning a large segment of the population perceive of them-
selves as losers and have no options other than to fight, then the term “land 
grab” has validity. The simple truth is this: all revolutions great and small start 
with aggravated individuals who eventually become aggrieved populations. 
As Ted Gurr argued in his seminal work, Why Men Rebel, the development 
of a perceived gap between people’s expectations and their ability to satisfy 
those expectations—what Gurr termed relative deprivation—can result in 
mass frustration, popular uprisings, and ultimately political violence.20 When 
pushed to the edge of survival, humans have a tendency to fight back. In the 
case of Africa writ large, the structural variables driving global capitalism, 
combined with the comparative weakness, corruption, and inability of 
existing nation-states to “get it right,” may make it inevitable that routine 
outbreaks of localized warfare will increasingly resemble what is taking place 
in Mali. 
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The tax man should think twice before weighing in when profes-
sionals debate CT and COIN. But working in the tax profession will teach you 
a thing or two about the relationship between government and those gov-
erned. My own military years were spent in the Norwegian HJK/FSK (Special 
Forces) in the mid-eighties, and during that time, I learned that military force 
is useful for three kinds of tasks:
1. Eliminating the force of an opponent (either materially or psychologi-
cally, or both);
2. Denying an opponent the use of a resource (usually terrain, but also 
radio frequencies or water);
3. Securing a resource for one’s own use (usually terrain).
From this perspective, the use of military force to go after al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan makes perfect sense.
Phase one involved knocking out the fighting resources of the Taliban and 
al Qaeda.
Phase two involved denying the opponent the use of Afghanistan as a safe 
haven.
Phase three saw the United States and its allies striving to secure Afghanistan 
as an area for their own operations. This phase, it could be argued, served the 
dual objectives of eliminating the fighting power of al Qaeda and the Taliban 
in the region, and securing a vantage point in the only place within close 
proximity to the strategic problem of an unstable, nuclear-armed Pakistan.
Phase three is an occupation. You may dress it in any language you want, but 
as a military operation it still is an occupation. 
The political problem is that tasks two and three are military operations for 
which there is no “win.” They do not have an endpoint. They are something 
you keep on doing for as long as the benefits are higher than the costs. You 
keep your men on top of Hill 386 not because you want to grow grapes there 
for generations, but because it is the perfect place from which to direct artil-
lery fire on the enemy. If the enemy moves, the hill becomes useless, and you 
would be stupid if you did not cut the cost of keeping men there.
Based on this Stone Age perspective on the use of military force, I see at 
least two problems with COIN. The first problem is one of deception. The 
political and military rhetoric used to communicate about the conflict is one 
of the main problems with Afghanistan today. It is the rhetoric of COIN. We 
have wrapped something that has the nature of tasks two or three in words 
belonging to task one: “winning hearts and minds,” instead of “occupying for 
as long as the costs remain lower than the benefits.” 
The Problem with Rhetoric in COIN
Gaute Solheim
Tasks two and three are 
military operations for 
which there is no “win.”
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This is why politicians love COIN. It creates the illusion of an operation with 
the character of task 1, and gives politicians the rhetoric they need when they 
want to dress up an occupation as something else, something more palatable. 
The vocabulary of COIN allows them to create the illusion of a future victory 
parade after “winning” those hearts and minds, while pointing to military and 
academic COIN experts as witnesses for the truth of the words they use.
What is hidden from the public is the fact that the military profession has 
changed its rhetoric from that once used by generals to that of politicians, 
rewriting occupation to resemble the theatre of an election campaign in which 
you try to “win” hearts and minds. This shift obscures the reality that to “win” 
an election is not the kind of “winning” we think about in terms of a task 
one–type military operation. An election amounts to a ceasefire with a time 
limit. The opposition will be just as resourceful when it comes to the next 
election.
COIN is at best the least costly way to conduct task two or three operations. 
Worse, it is wilful deception of your own population. Worst of all, you end 
up fooling yourself. As Robert Feynman told Caltech students in a 1974 
commencement address, “The first principle is that you must not fool 
yourself—and you are the easiest person to fool.”1 An illustrative example 
of the importance of fooling neither yourself nor others with COIN rhetoric 
appeared in an op-ed in a Norwegian newspaper in October 2012.2 A Norwe-
gian LTG assessed whether our military involvement in Afghanistan had been 
a success or a failure. His analysis was based entirely on the premise that the 
reason why Norway sent military forces to Afghanistan was to help establish 
a stable democracy that would respect the rule of law and human rights, and 
improve the living conditions of the Afghan people.
I was surprised. From 2001 until I read this, I had believed that the reason 
we Norwegians sent our soldiers there was because it was payback time. As a 
nation with a long coastline that reaches to the Arctic sea, we have a strategic 
interest in keeping the United States as a close friend, and such friendships 
come at a cost. Soldiers in Afghanistan were the hard currency with which 
such strategic debts could be paid after 9/11. Later, when we said, “No, thank 
you,” after being invited to go into Iraq, we experienced a corresponding 
devaluation of our standing with Washington.3
The second problem with COIN rhetoric is that it limits our ability to learn 
the lessons that are there to be learned. By denying the fact that we are either 
trying to deny someone the use of territory or secure our own use of that 
territory, we fail to learn from some of the most successful prior occupations. 
Among these are the German occupations during WWII, if we can put aside 
moral judgement and evaluate them purely with regard to effectiveness and 
efficiency. As a Norwegian, I know Norwegian history best, so will use it for 
an example.
From a strategic perspective, it was important for Germany to secure Norway 
for its own operations. Norway provided the Germans with strategically 
located harbours and access to the North Atlantic, and secured them a 
The military profession has 
changed its rhetoric from 
that once used by generals 
to that of politicians.
Norwegian soldiers in 
Afghanistan were the hard 
currency with which strategic 
debts could be paid after 9/11.
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year-round supply of Swedish iron ore, while at the same time denying the 
Allies the use of Norway as a safe haven for support to the Soviet Union. 
The occupation’s costs were kept low by relying on a puppet regime (the 
infamous Quisling4) and building support among the Norwegians by 
providing work. The Nazis managed to build almost 300 coastal forts, along 
with roads and factories, in only a couple of years, using a population of less 
than 4 million people. Norway’s neighbour Sweden (read: Pakistan) served as 
a safe haven for the Norwegian resistance. The Germans, however, managed to 
keep the harm inflicted by this resistance movement at an absolute minimum 
level during their five years of occupation. 
The occupation of Norway was a masterpiece of COIN, which relied heavily 
on tweaking existing local structures into supportive functions, observing local 
procedures for deciding and meting out punishment, and elegantly relying on 
the existing security units, which already were very well trained in gathering 
intelligence against labour movements and communists. A body of literature 
is now emerging that offers a perspective less influenced by stories about 
Norway’s rather few real resistance heroes and the Norwegian people’s need to 
feel good about themselves in the spring of 1945.
So this is the second casualty of COIN rhetoric: We fail to learn from any-
thing that we classify as an occupation.
From friends still serving in the army, my impression is that your “conven-
tional” officer feels more at home when reality is described in terms of tasks 
one, two, and three and calculations of cost–benefit than when the talk is all 
about hearts and minds. Special operations are sometimes useful tools when 
it comes to keeping costs (material or political or both) low. As stand-alone 
forces deployed with a lot of COIN rhetoric, however, they are better for im-
proving the image of political leaders than they are for improving the strategic 
outlook of a nation.
Some Final Thoughts
Here is an entertaining side note: The U.S. field manual for COIN, FM 3-24, 
offers a fantastic (probably unintentional) illustration of what happens when 
field manual meets reality. Under the headline “Hand Shake Con” on top of 
page 58, you will find this quote:
General Anthony C. Zinni:5
“… [t]he Joint Chiefs of Staff asked me … ‘The lines in your com-
mand chart, the command relationships, what are they? OpCon 
[operational control]? TaCon [tactical control]? Command?’ ‘Sir, 
we don’t ask, because no one can sign up to any of that stuff.’ 
‘Well, how do you do business?’ ‘Hand Shake Con. That’s it.’ No 
memoranda of agreement. No memoranda of understanding … 
[T]he relationships are worked out on the scene, and they aren’t 
pretty. And you don’t really want to capture them, … distil them, 
and say as you go off into the future, you’re going to have this sort 
of command relationship… .”
The German occupation 
of Norway was a 
masterpiece of COIN.
Quisling visits the German propaganda 
companies’ large exhibition “War 
and Correspondent” in the National 
Gallery in Oslo on August 15, 1944. 
The exhibition was about German 
war reporters. The photo is from the 
exhibition hall for the army’s film reports. 
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I discovered Zinni’s quote just fifteen pages after I had read paragraph 1-133 on 
page 43 of the manual:
Every action by counterinsurgents leaves a “forensic trace” that 
may be required later in a court of law. Counterinsurgents docu-
ment all their activities to preserve, wherever possible, a chain of 
evidence. Accurate documentation can also be important means 
to counter insurgent propaganda.
The clash between reality and the theory of COIN is documented by the field 
manual itself! 
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4 Vidkun Abraham Lauritz Jonssøn Quisling was a Norwegian 
military officer and politician, whose willing collaboration with 
the Nazi regime during World War II turned his name into a 
byword for a traitor.
5 U.S. Marine Corps General (Ret.) Anthony Zinni served as 
commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and 
then CENTCOM commander from the mid-1990s until his 
retirement in 2000. 
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During our first few academic quarters at NPS, my thesis partner, 
Wing Commander Srinivas Ganapathiraju (Indian Air Force), and I engaged 
in some sporadic dialogue while reflecting on the idea of how a country’s in-
stability might make it the breeding ground for the kinds of insurgencies that 
are of interest to our respective countries’ armed forces. Then, while reading 
the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy for one of our classes, we found our-
selves questioning the premise of the “democratic peace theory” upon which 
much of U.S. strategy is based. We intuitively understood that democracy, in 
and of itself, may not be necessary or sufficient as a precondition for political 
stability in a given country. Context matters, and we were both driven to 
discover under what conditions governance could lead to greater stability in 
certain types of deeply divided societies, like Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Although the growth or decline of an insurgency depends on a number of fac-
tors, including the opportunities or threats the insurgency faces, its mobilizing 
structures, and the strength of the insurgents’ cause, we chose to focus our 
attention on the opportunities and obstacles that are presented by a country’s 
system of governance. While the idea of better understanding governance 
may not seem an obvious first choice for two combat veterans who have been 
involved in their respective countries’ military efforts to counter insurgencies, 
we both felt that misaligned governance accounted for more of the problems 
with recent nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan than any mis-
guided tactical, operational, or even strategic military efforts in either country. 
Beyond identifying a problem with how each country’s system of governance 
fit its population, our discussions kept bringing us back to the realization that 
there were distinct societal divides in both countries. In each case, governance 
was considered illegitimate by minority groups whenever they didn’t have 
sufficient voice or representative authority within the central government. It 
was apparent, however, that some countries with similarly divided societies, 
like India, have managed to achieve considerable stability over time, thanks to 
more decentralized systems of governance. We wanted to know whether there 
was something intrinsically beneficial about India’s model of governance that 
could be applied to other countries with deep-seated divisions. Specifically, we 
sought to discover whether there is a relationship between the decentralization 
of governance and political stability in deeply fragmented societies.
In the course of our early literature review and while designing the theoretical 
framework for our thesis proposal, we were introduced to the ideas of conso-
ciational democracy2 and social fit theory.3 Our discussions with faculty about 
these concepts were instrumental to how we conceived of both the governance 
problem that confronts divided countries, and a governance model to help 
stabilize such societies. We consequently formulated a framework to assess the 
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Divided Countries1
MAJ Robert Miske, USA
Is there a relationship between 
decentralized governance and 




degree of social fit between a country’s method of governance and its popula-
tion’s ethnic fractionalization (or divisiveness). 
In our framework, we listed some of the most important factors that comprise 
“national identity” (the column Independent Variables in Figure 1). We also 
included the four prominent tenets of consociational democracy that com-
prise power-sharing (the column Dependent Variables in Figure 1). We used 
this theoretical framework as a model to understand the various dynamics 
affecting a country’s stability, and ultimately to test our hypothesis that cor-
relates better “social fit” and greater decentralization with stability.
Although we arrived at our problem statement and research question fairly 
quickly, we knew that our methodology for studying the nature of the 
relationship between governance and stability required considerably more 
attention. It was important for us to devise our case selection criteria in such 
a way that we could be reasonably sure that if we saw a change in governance, 
we would see a corresponding change in stability. Furthermore, we wanted to 
limit our subset of countries to those that were not only highly fragmented, 
but had shown a propensity towards conflict as a result of those societal divi-
sions. We decided that post-conflict ethnically divided countries would best 
meet these criteria and test our model. 
To validate our methodology, we examined several indices that provide the 
most recent and objective analysis of countries’ status. These include the Fund 
for Peace’s “Failed States Index” and “Conflict Assessment Indicators” for 
2006 and 2011, as well as James Fearon’s 2003 “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity 
by Country.”4 In addition to looking for countries that displayed a substantial 
increase or decrease in their overall composite conflict assessment indicators, 
Government legitimacy turns 
out to be a function of individual 
and group perceptions.
Figure 1: Theoretical framework for stability in  
post-conflict ethnically divided countries
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we also looked for a corresponding increase or decrease in three indicators 
that we determined were most representative of instability resulting from a 
country’s divided society: a legacy of vengeance seeking (group grievance or 
paranoia); the criminalization and/or de-legitimization of the state through 
corrupt or extra-legal practices; and the rise of factionalized elites. 
We also matched the countries’ conflict assessment scores and regional 
rankings with their ethnic and cultural fractionalization scores and regional 
rankings. In both indices, higher scores meant a greater degree of conflict 
potential and fractionalization, respectively. We initially narrowed our selec-
tion to seventeen countries from four different regions (see Table 1). In the 
end, we selected six countries—three with increasing and three with de-
creasing stability across all four regions—all of them ranked high in terms of 











































































































































































2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011
Afghanistan 99.8/10 107.5/7 9.1 9.3 8.3 9.7 8 9.4 3/23      0.751 1/23
India 70.4/93 79.3/76 6.9 8.2 4.8 5.8 5.7 6.8 2/23      0.811 2/23
Nepal 95.4/20 93.7/27 9.2 9 9.2 7.9 9 8 5/23      0.677 5/23
Myanmar 96.5/18 98.3/18 9 8.7 9.2 9.7 8 8.3 10/23    0.522 9/23
Indonesia 89.2/32 81.6/64 6.3 6.6 6.7 6.7 7.9 7 3/23      0.766 6/23
Nigeria 94.4/22 99.9/14 9.1 9.3 9 9 9 9.5 16/43    0.805 4/43
Rwanda 92.9/24 91.0/34 9 8.2 8.7 7.1 8.9 8.4 43/43    0.18 43/43
Zimbabwe 108.9/5 107.9/6 8.5 9 8.9 9.3 8.5 9.6 38/43    0.366 40/43
Somalia 105.9/7 113.4/1 8 9.5 10 9.8 9.8 9.8 15/43    0.812 32/43
Sudan 112.3/1 108.7 9.7 9.9 9.5 9.4 9.1 9.9 29/43    0.708 3/43
Kenya 88.6/34 98.7/16 6.7 8.7 7.3 8.9 7.6 8.8 11/43   0.852 9/43
Bosnia 88.5/35 80.9/69 8.6 8.4 8.1 7.6 8.7 9.2 3/31      0.681 26/31
Kyrgyzstan 90.3/28 91.8/31 7 8.3 8.3 9 7.9 8.3 4/31      0.679 1/31
Kazakhstan 71.9/88 70.2/107 5.1 6 7.5 7.2 7.7 7.7 14/31    0.664 2/31
Uzbekistan 94.4/23 88.3/39 7.5 7.4 9.3 8.4 9.1 8.7 6/31      0.485 6/31
Lebanon 80.5/65 87.7/43 7.8 8.7 6.4 7 8.3 8.8 1/19      0.78 14/19
Iran 84.0/53 90.2/35 6.9 8.5 8.1 9.1 8.8 9.2 4/19      0.669 2/19
Table 1: Country Case Selection—Preliminary Selection




Table 2: Country Case Selection—Final
23
February 2013 
After performing a rigorous case study selection, we found ourselves needing 
to conduct further research on both consociationalism and decentralization in 
order to assess how both methods might be best adapted to a given country’s 
“national identity” to achieve an optimal degree of social fit. In our thesis, we 
dedicated two chapters to understanding the nature of democracy in post-
conflict ethnically divided countries: exploring both the tenets of consocia-
tional democracy and how decentralization of various functions of governance 
can reduce the potential for conflict within a country. These theoretical 
chapters served a dual purpose: they enabled us to define the metrics by which 
we would analyze the nature of governance in our six case study countries, 
and provided a foundational understanding for how greater stability might be 
achieved in deeply divided countries.
Although many of the demographic, economic, geopolitical, and topographical 
factors affecting a country’s stability can be quantified, our research suggested 
that, with respect to governance, it is legitimacy that matters above all else. 
Therefore, while it can be argued that one system of governance is superior 
to another if one relies on various quantitative indices, legitimacy turns out 
to be a function of individual and group perceptions that can be as diverse as 
the populations that generate them. This led us to build on the argument that 
John Bishop and Michael George made in their thesis: To gain legitimacy and 
reduce the potential for conflict, a system of governance must be designed 
with local, and thus societal, contexts in mind to achieve a social fit.
Following an analysis of Afghanistan, India, Rwanda, Kenya, Lebanon, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, we were able to conclude that a system of gover-
nance built around a decentralized framework offers a more viable option 
than any other currently being proposed for deeply divided societies. Our 
findings also suggest that tailored decentralization of governance functions 
requires steadfast adherence to consociational democracy tenets. Both, when 
done together, can achieve the “right” social fit for post-conflict ethnically 
divided countries. Although involvement by external actors, economic growth 
(or decline), and other geopolitical considerations can delay stability or serve 
as a catalyst for instability, it is the governance dimension of achieving a social 
fit that matters most. 
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1 This article is a synopsis of research done for a graduate thesis 
written while the author was a student in the Defense Analysis 
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Ganapathiraju and Robert Miske, “Decentralizing Democracy: 
A Governance Proposal for Post-conflict Ethnically Divided 
Countries,” Master’s thesis, Department of Defense Analysis, 
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2 Arend Lijphart, credited as the founding theorist of 
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Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy,” American Political 
Science Review, vol. 9, no. 2 (June 1996): 258–268.
3 John Bishop and Michael George argue that the people’s 
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Country,” Journal of Economic Growth vol. 8 (2003): 215–219.  
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The decade since the United States began its war against al Qaeda 
in Afghanistan has brought changes to how militaries operate. The insights 
gained during this time are being captured as part of the DoD-sponsored 
Counter-Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP), which preserves critical lessons 
applicable to future engagements.1 One of the key lessons to emerge from 
operations in Afghanistan is how important language and culture are when 
working with international partners to disrupt terrorist networks. As a result 
of a decade of irregular warfare, coalition building, and stability operations, 
military personnel have come to be seen not only as warfighters or protectors, 
but also as trainers, community builders, and cultural ambassadors. In execut-
ing these new missions, operators have learned—often the hard way—the 
importance of cultural and language skills. 
While the value of cultural knowledge and language competence is clear, 
exactly what kind of training soldiers should have to achieve that competence 
is less so. Does simply exhibiting cultural respect matter more than under-
standing cultural nuances, for example, or does a deep understanding of cul-
ture and language allow for more meaningful and effective interactions with 
local forces and communities? This paper outlines CTAP’s mission, presents 
contrasting lessons on language and culture from two CTAP interviews, and 
assesses the implications for future military training. In the United States, for 
example, the U.S. Army’s “Regionally Aligned Brigades” initiative, designed 
to provide cultural training specific to the region where soldiers will deploy, is 
scheduled to begin in 2013. We conclude that, while language fluency should 
continue to be a priority for select operators and missions, “cultural intel-
ligence” should be cultivated in operators at all levels.
The Importance of Capturing and Applying Lessons 
Learned in Afghanistan
The Counter-Terrorism Archive Project, sponsored under the DoD’s Com-
bating Terrorism Fellowship Program, aims to capture insights and lessons 
learned in the last decade’s efforts to disrupt and eradicate terrorist networks. 
The storytellers in this archive are personnel, both military and civilian, who 
have taken part in the ongoing fight against terrorists and militant extremists. 
The lessons are many and varied: navigating new terrain and new methods; 
the agonies of asymmetric warfare; the value of institutional and international 
cooperation; and the pitfalls of “nation-building.” These changes have trans-
formed how our military operates, and must also inform how it develops for 
the future. 
As part of CTAP, the authors interviewed counterterrorism operators from 
special operations communities in Norway and at NATO Headquarters in 
Belgium.2 One topic of discussion that emerged in both locations was the 
issue of language and cultural training. In particular, two interviews, one with 
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a Norwegian officer involved in mentoring Afghan SOF, and the other with 
a U.S. officer deployed as part of the “AFPAK Hands” program (now called 
Afghan Hands due to deteriorating relations with Pakistan), provided con-
trasting perspectives on which elements of cultural training are most critical. 
The Norwegian interviewee, reflecting on his own experience in Afghanistan, 
concluded that cultural respect is of primary importance, because it is respect, 
rather than an acquired understanding of language and cultural practices, 
that builds relationships of trust in an international theater. For him, respect 
meant being open to local methods of training and operating, as well as 
showing regard for different perspectives and practices, even when those 
practices were hard to understand. It also means being aware of how one’s 
own cultural context or “lens” affects communication with—and perceptions 
of—others. 
In contrast, the U.S. interviewee, recalling his time with the AFPAK Hands 
program, found that intensive language training and study of cultural prac-
tices and nuances were critical to building genuine relationships, as these skills 
support the clear dialogue necessary for governance and development to take 
root. Hence, he considered the understanding of specific cultural practices to 
be just as important, if not more so, than simply being open and adaptable.
Does Cultural Respect Matter More than Cultural 
Understanding … ?
According to the Norwegian officer we interviewed, “It doesn’t matter if you 
have three or four months of training if you come to Afghanistan and don’t 
respect the culture, and you are trying to work with the people and they don’t 
Respect means being aware of 
how one’s own cultural “lens” 
affects communication with—
and perceptions of—others.
A U.S.  Army officer uses a 
translator, second from right, to 
speak with Afghan elders.
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respect you.” From his experience in Afghanistan, he observed that without 
a significant history in-country, international operators could never develop 
a full understanding of the complexities of a culture, even with intensive 
training. More pointedly, he surmised that cultural competence, without cul-
tural respect, would be worthless. Therefore, he contended, the most critical 
training for any military is to establish a norm of cultural respect, which can 
then be applied globally by all deployed troops, not only by those who receive 
intense training specific to a given culture. 
How then does cultural respect, as opposed to cultural understanding, mani-
fest itself in-theater? For the Norwegian SOF unit that has been mentoring 
Afghan military units, the key was getting alongside their Afghan counterparts 
not as teachers but as role models—a subtle difference, but one that allows 
local partners to take ownership of new methods and strategies. “It is better 
to come into Afghanistan and be alongside the people you are working with. 
Show them that you respect their culture and show them that you want to 
work with them for their cause, not fighting your own battle.”
The focus of his work was therefore not on telling, but on doing, in the hope 
that lessons would permeate in a more indirect, more lasting way. “We try 
to focus on team leaders … showing them things we think it is valuable for 
them to learn and giving them examples, but letting them make the choice on 
whether they want to focus on it… . We are leading as much as we need, but 
they are looking at our leadership and hopefully try to implement that in their 
way of doing things.” 
For military units trained to undertake operations in a particular way, and 
which have had success with particular methods and strategies, it can be 
difficult to impart skills and lessons in a more informal manner. Yet cultural 
respect rests very much in how information and assistance is provided, as 
opposed to exactly what is provided. It also requires an authenticity of intent, 
“showing them you are there for them, for them to develop, not for us to de-
velop … it is better to let them do it their way … better than hoping that they 
will react, think, and do as we do in the Western part of the world.” Hence, 
training for Norwegian officers involved in mentoring Afghan security forces 
focuses on instilling cultural respect and openness to indigenous ways of 
assimilating skills and information. “We are not focusing so much on learning 
their culture or learning their habits in our training … it doesn’t mean we 
don’t try and learn their culture, but there is a difference between learning 
culture and having cultural respect.”
Our interviewee was less clear on exactly how cultural respect could be 
taught: “I’m not sure that we are aware of why we succeed. We [Norway] are 
not a threat to anyone … [and] we are not an aggressive unit … we are a unit 
that is curious about other people and how they live. I think the mentality is 
different. If we had units that were only there for fighting, it would be harder 
to get them into mentoring.” He also observed that Norwegian culture has a 
certain “naiveté,” and “the lucky result of that is that we can build up good 
rapport.”
While it was difficult for our interviewee to define exactly how cultural respect 
could be taught pre-deployment, he was clear about how it must be imple-
mented in the field. In particular, coalition forces need to better integrate their 
“There is a difference 




activities with the Afghan system, particularly when it comes to intelligence 
sharing and cooperation, rather than remaining separate. “We have problems 
sharing ISAF intelligence with the Afghans, so we are operating along two 
operational lines. We can’t build up a system in Afghanistan before we start 
to rely on the Afghans, before we start to implement them in all procedures 
and follow their system… . The Afghan leaders are the reason why we can do 
[an operation], but the Afghans don’t want to do it because they don’t know 
anything about the intelligence behind it: Why should they put their soldiers 
at risk… ?” 
From his perspective, local forces must be seen as equal, not junior or less 
trusted partners. Building up this sense of trust and partnership takes time. 
“You need to be there, live with them in their way, spending months with 
them, to build up the rapport.” It also means being open to learning from 
those local partners, rather than being solely focused on developing their 
capabilities. “If you are going to see the threats from Afghanistan, you have 
to see it from Afghan eyes… . I think we have to work closer with the security 
forces in the country … than we have done.”
… Or Does a Deep Understanding of Culture and 
Language Allow for Deeper Cooperation?
“Winning the hearts and minds” of the Afghan population has been an 
underlying mantra of the American narrative of the war for a decade now, 
but the most effective method of doing that has remained elusive. In 2009, 
then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen lent his 
support to a program aimed at cultural training, known as AFPAK Hands. 
Now called Afghan Hands, the program consists of a 3 to 4-year training 
and deployment commitment designed to train participants from all service 
branches to operate in sync with their foreign counterparts. A participant in 
the program spends five to six months learning either Pashto or Dari, and 
then several months intensively studying the culture of the specific area in 
Afghanistan where he or she will be working. The participant deploys for a 
one-year period, returns stateside to a domestic post focused on Afghanistan 
for one year, and then returns to Afghanistan for another year. 
Our U.S. AFPAK Hands interviewee had completed his training, spent a year 
in a province of Afghanistan, and was now at a NATO post awaiting redeploy-
ment back to the same province. A former linguist who had served in that 
capacity in Operation Desert Storm, he focused on some of the ways that 
he has seen cultural training evolve. In the early part of his career, cultural 
training was mostly based on language, and “being a linguist meant just 
learning through headphones,” whereas currently the language training a 
person receives pre-deployment is paired with cultural education. In addi-
tion to the more in-depth training, which includes cultural norms, customs, 
religion, and regional nuances, he explained that the operators’ longer deploy-
ments to specific regions allow them to use their training to build relation-
ships and consistency in a way that shorter deployments (normally six to nine 
months) cannot. 
In an unstable environment 
where miscommunication 
can have devastating effects, 
language fluency is critical.
Repartition map of language families
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In contrast to our Norwegian interviewee, who had observed that the value of 
cultural respect for opening doors was equal to in-depth language training but 
with less investment of money and time, his U.S. counterpart spoke about the 
value of intensive language and cultural training as a means to build genuine, 
rather than superficial, connections and relationships. He analogized that 
if you went to conduct business in any foreign nation and 
could not speak the language in which the business was being 
conducted, your understanding of the transaction would be 
limited to the most basic terms, or you would have to rely on 
someone else to interpret. 
It was the same with military operations and training 
overseas, he said. Knowing the language not only means that 
you can understand what those around you are saying, but 
it also allows you to convey clear messages and instruction, 
as well as exchange ideas. In an unstable environment where 
miscommunication can have devastating effects, language 
fluency is critical. Language skills also eliminate reliance 
on an interpreter, making communication quicker, more personal, and less 
susceptible to misrepresentation. In addition, he stated, “Afghan local police 
... any group … is only as good as the leadership they have in place,” and in 
his opinion language fluency makes identifying and mentoring local leaders 
possible.
According to our American interviewee, the critical aims in Afghanistan were 
governance, development, and security, and of those security is paramount, as 
“the other two cannot exist without established security… .” Without proper 
language and cultural training, he suggested, operators cannot communicate 
well enough within the community to develop the level of security needed to 
defend against insurgencies and enable effective governance and development. 
Simply put, he explained, it is difficult to travel, gain access to needed sup-
plies, and garner useful information if an operator does not understand the 
language or cannot use knowledge of cultural practices, nuances, and hierar-
chies to build and then leverage relationships. In a part of the world where 
information is critical to the fight, our interviewee considered the AFPAK 
Hands methodology—intense language and cultural training coupled with 
longer and repeated deployments—the best method for getting coalition op-
erators into key mentorship positions. Being in these positions makes it easier 
to impart both skills and knowledge, but also to receive critical information, 
through “speaking the language and learning from the Afghans.” This method, 
he emphasized, offers the allies their best chance of success in Afghanistan.
A U.S. Response to the Importance of Culture: Regionally 
Aligned Army Brigades 
It was evident from both of our interviews that the lessons from Afghanistan 
on the importance of culture have left an impression on international military 
personnel. The question that remains, however, is how these lessons should 
be applied. Exactly how should militaries respond to issues of language and 
culture in a manner that best promotes success? 
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In March 2012, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno announced 
a new initiative to regionally align the army’s brigades with each of the six 
U.S. Global Combatant Commands, observing that “We have learned many 
lessons over the last 10 years, but one of the most compelling is that—whether 
you are working among the citizens of a country, or working with their 
government or Armed Forces—nothing is as important to your long term 
success as understanding the prevailing culture and values.”3 This new regional 
alignment would see Army units and leaders focus on a specific region within 
their normal training program, and receive cultural training and language fa-
miliarization relevant to that region while continuing to train in core combat 
skills and capabilities.4 
The arguments behind the concept of regionally aligned brigades are in-
stinctively compelling. Who wouldn’t want soldiers more attuned to the 
operational theater in which they find themselves? In addition, the initiative 
is designed to have deterrence value, a point that was explicitly acknowledged 
by Odierno.5 Despite this, there are problems with the concept. Some of 
these are institutional: as Steve Griffin observed in the Small Wars Journal, the 
army lacks an adaptive personnel system to go along with this new process of 
regional alignment, which means a soldier may receive training in a specific 
language and culture, only to then rotate to a new unit aligned to a different 
region.6 Some are more procedural: regional alignment threatens to revive the 
tendency toward “unit favoritism” that existed prior to 9/11, while what Griffin 
calls a “distinct lack of training focus” may mean that brigades become good 
at a lot of things but great at none, requiring yet more specific training when 
it actually comes time to deploy.7
While criticisms can always be made about the implementation of new 
directives, this article is concerned less with the administrative nuances of the 
program than with the language and cultural assumptions that underpin it. It 
is hard to argue against the value of language and cultural skills, particularly 
A “distinct lack of training 
focus” may mean that brigades 
become good at a lot of 
things but great at none.
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond T. Odierno
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under the requirements of foreign internal defense, combating terrorism, 
and counterinsurgency, when communication and cooperation with local 
security forces and populations can be critical. As Steve Griffin has noted, 
“Soldier proficiency in language and culture can be immense combat multi-
pliers—some might argue that these skills have even more value than the latest 
weapon or vehicle platform.”8
Lack of cultural understanding has also been highlighted as a security issue. 
The U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned has been developing a handbook 
suggesting that coalition leaders would benefit from more in-depth cultural 
understanding of local security forces, and vice versa, to help guard against 
the interpersonal tensions that can lead to “green on blue” attacks.9 A former 
Afghan soldier named Mahmood, who carried out such an attack in May 
2012 before “defecting” to the Taliban, suggested that simmering resentment 
between Afghans and their international counterparts can result in violence: 
“I have intimate friends in the army who have the same opinion [of Ameri-
cans] as I do.”10 This suggests that cultural training is not only a potential 
“combat multiplier” but also a conflict suppressor, a fundamental element of 
damage control: first—do no harm. 
Given these assumptions, does the Regionally Aligned Brigades concept truly 
embrace the lessons learned over the last ten years with respect to the impor-
tance of language and culture, or does it simply pay lip service, assuming that 
any language and cultural training is better than none at all? Can it provide a 
model for other countries? The obvious and significant pitfall of the concept is 
its lack of specificity. With the breadth of languages and dialects across Africa 
and the Middle East, it is anyone’s guess exactly what language(s) should be 
taught to the inaugural brigade aligned to AFRICOM beginning in 2014. Even 
once that is decided, the language training provided at the brigade level is 
likely to be basic, not the kind of fluency advocated by our AFPAK Hands 
interviewee as necessary to improve security or undermine insurgencies. 
Likewise with culture: international operators in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
learned the hard way that cultural practices prevalent in one province may be 
foreign in another; hence, any regionally aligned brigade will face a herculean 
task trying to develop a useful modicum of cultural fluency for an entire 
region. As our Norwegian SOF interviewee observed, the cultural complexities 
of a society may not be fully comprehensible even with extensive training. 
Add to this the fact that the proclivities of individuals are the key to results. 
Cultural training that can be applied successfully in a host nation is as depen-
dent on an individual’s desire to internalize and manifest cultural awareness 
as it is on the content of the program itself. It is unlikely that even a majority 
of the three to four thousand members of a Regionally Aligned Brigade will 
share that aptitude.
The importance of the individual is also highlighted in a U.S. Army Research 
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) study, which found that, 
while cultural knowledge can be helpful when operating in a foreign environ-
ment, it is insufficient without the behavioral skills necessary to interpret 
and respond to dynamic cultural cues. The institute developed a concept of 
“cross-cultural competence,” in which the three components of knowledge 
(cultural understanding of one’s own and another culture); affect (attitudes 
toward foreign cultures and the motivation to learn about and engage with 
“Interpersonal skills tend to 
make stronger contributions 
than language proficiency 
or prior experience.”
Cultural training is not only a 
potential “combat multiplier” 
but also a conflict suppressor.
It is anyone’s guess exactly 
what language(s) should 
be taught to the inaugural 
brigade aligned to AFRICOM.
31
February 2013 
them); and skills (the ability to regulate one’s own reactions in a cross-cultural 
setting, interpersonal skills, and the flexibility to assume the perspective of 
someone from a different culture) combine to provide the capabilities neces-
sary to work well in a foreign culture.11 Crucially, in developing this concept, 
researchers found that skills and affect were more directly related to successful 
outcomes than knowledge: “[C]ultural knowledge may have limited utility if 
rigid interpersonal behavior or ethnocentric attitudes are not addressed.”12
The ARI also noted in its research that language proficiency, while contrib-
uting to positive outcomes for individuals working in foreign environments, 
usually had less effect than expected: “Interpersonal skills tend to make 
stronger contributions than language proficiency or prior international 
experience.”13 What is more, such programs are usually much less costly than 
comprehensive language and cultural training.
A Proposed Alternative Model: Cultural Intelligence and 
Strategic Language Fluency 
Given this analysis, before sending personnel into language and cultural 
training, the command level should first determine when specific language 
and cultural capabilities are a must (and for whom), and when simple cultural 
respect is sufficient. Like any skill, language and cultural capabilities reveal 
their value in their application. To be the kind of “immense combat multi-
plier” suggested by Steve Griffin, intensive language training must be targeted 
to a specific theater of operations as well as a specific type of mission. Done 
effectively, it has the potential for a high return on investment. 
Conversely, the development of cultural respect can boost the military’s 
effectiveness across the board if instituted effectively, by teaching interpersonal 
skills that are transferable and therefore flexible across different missions. As 
the ARI observed, 
Culture is best taught as a factor across full-spectrum operations, 
an enabler supporting other capabilities, rather than an “a la carte” 
supplement to conventional warfighter knowledge and skills. Fu-
ture strategic challenges may include multiple engagements around 
the world with a greater reliance on partner relationships, and 
expanded cultural breadth and agility will be required if we are to 
meet those challenges.14
So what might this “enabler” approach to culture look like? It must focus 
on ability rather than knowledge, and programs must be designed to deliver 
behavioral, not simply informational, education (an “EQ” vs. IQ approach).15 
This is an area where international militaries might benefit from the experi-
ence of intelligence agencies, for which the development of inter-cultural skills 
is fundamental. One model that has been reviewed positively by the Central 
Intelligence Agency16 is that of “cultural intelligence,” defined as “a person’s 
ability to adjust to new cultural contexts” based on behavioral, motivational, 
and cognitive elements and processes.17 The developers of this model, 
Christopher Earley and Soon Ang, assert that to function effectively in a new 
A quality of cultural 
intelligence is “a propensity 
to suspend judgment—to 
think before acting.”
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cultural context, an individual must be able to understand the new setting 
based on cultural cues, be committed to understanding the new culture and 
overcoming his or her limitations within it, and be able to apply specific 
actions demanded by specific cultural situations. In addition, psychologist 
Daniel Goleman points out that cultural intelligence allows for more logical, 
intelligent decision-making; he defines a quality of that intelligence as “a 
propensity to suspend judgment—to think before acting.”18 
Earley and Ang also point out that genuine cultural intelligence is not fixed 
and does not just come “naturally.” Rather, it requires constant refinement and 
learning. Therefore, in applying the lessons learned over the past decade and 
more on the importance of culture, military leaders must look not only at new 
initiatives, but also consider a fundamental change in how the military teaches 
all its soldiers, from the ground up and in an ongoing manner, to develop and 
apply cultural intelligence. This requires that the highest levels of command 
acknowledge the fundamental value of cultural competence for warfighting, 
and muster the institutional will to adapt accordingly. As the ARI has ob-
served, “[A]rmed forces cannot ‘surge’ cultural expertise, nor can they expect 
complex interpersonal skills and cultural cognition to develop when placed in 
competition with fundamental military skill sets.”19 
Conclusion
We have much to learn from those who have experienced 
the hardest lessons firsthand in the last decade of conflict, 
including our interviewees from Norway and the United 
States, even when their conclusions disagree. It is often in 
those points of difference that we learn the best lessons, 
in this instance the value of language and cultural fluency 
when they are strategically taught and applied. Nor should 
we overlook the compounding value of cultural intelligence 
as a fundamental, flexible skill and “combat multiplier,” and 
as a vital tool for sustaining peace. General (Ret.) David Pe-
traeus observed, “We have spent the last fifty years remem-
bering and forgetting the importance of cultural awareness 
… now it’s coming to us full force.”20 International military 
leaders and policymakers owe it to their operators not only 
to acknowledge the lessons learned, but to apply them 
effectively so that we might not spend the next fifty years 
forgetting what cost us so much to learn.  
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“Bad laws are the worst form of tyranny.” 
 —Edmund Burke, 18th century Irish statesman        
General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s cunning argument for the 
“Islamization” of Pakistan in the 1970s enabled him to weaken his secular op-
ponents and consolidate a decade of authoritarian rule over the country. His 
dogmatic Islamist reforms—especially with the amendment of the blasphemy 
laws—transformed the fabric of Pakistani society. Although the blasphemy 
laws originated in British-controlled India in 1860 to deter religious persecu-
tion of heterogeneous groups, Zia-ul-Haq’s tainted amendment of the laws 
paved the way for institutionalized socio-religious intolerance and violent 
extremism in Pakistan.1 These egregious laws continue to permit shocking 
abuses against Muslims and minorities, as well as worsen Islamic radicalization 
not only in Pakistan, but in other countries as well.2 Militant groups in Paki-
stan have also exploited the draconian laws to legitimize their moral authority 
and galvanize flourishing conservative Islamic groups already sympathetic to 
the jihadi cause. 
This article will outline 
the content of Pakistan’s 
blasphemy laws, and 
discuss the adverse effects 
they have had on minority 
groups and dissident 
Muslims in the country, 
as well as the veneer of 
legitimacy they have given 
to extremists both in Paki-
stan and its neighboring 
country, Afghanistan. This 
increasing radicalization 
of elements in Pakistani society not only has had ripple effects in Afghanistan, 
but also has at times jeopardized Pakistani relations with the United States. 
The article will explain the failed attempts at repealing the laws, and provide 
some recommendations to improve the laws as they currently stand. 
Pakistan’s Penal Code: Blasphemy Laws
The coup d’état in 1977 that ousted Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s populist Pakistan 
Peoples’ Party (PPP) and installed the Zia-ul-Haq regime emboldened Paki-
stan’s religious extremists. Deviating from the country’s pluralistic and secular 
origins, Zia-ul-Haq institutionalized Islamic tenets and laid the foundations 
for theocratic rule in the country by creating the Federal Shariat Court. With 
his support, this body used its religious authority to examine existing Paki-
stani laws for their obedience to Islamic teachings. Furthermore, he sought 
to imbed sharia ordinances within Pakistan’s constitution, and eventually 
Equivocated Intentions: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan
Amina Kator-Mubarez 
Naval Postgraduate School
Left: General Zia ul Haq. Right: A public flogging during his rule 3
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succeeded in orchestrating sharia’s gradual supremacy over the constitu-
tion itself.4 Consequently, the “Federal Shariat Court, [was] accorded wide 
discretionary power, [and] became the state’s legal instrument to legitimize 
subsequent criminal ordinances,” also referred to as Pakistan Penal Codes 
(PPC).5 An amalgamation of sharia and English law, the PPC explicitly state 
the punishments for multifarious offences in Pakistan. 
The blasphemy laws that are the focus of this article sit within Sections 
295–298 of the Penal Code, titled, “Of Offences Relating to Religion.”6 
During his decade-long rule, Zia-ul-Haq significantly strengthened the 
blasphemy laws through a series of martial law amendments; five additional 
clauses were inserted. Following are Sections 295-B, 295-C, and 298-A of the 
Penal Code [emphasis added]:
295B. [President’s Order 1 of 1982] Defiling, etc., of Holy Qur’an:
Whoever willfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the 
Holy Qur’an or of an extract  therefrom or uses it in any deroga-
tory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable 
with imprisonment for life.
295C. [Criminal Law Amendment Act, (111 of 1986), S. 2] 
Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet:
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinua-
tion, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy 
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with 
death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.  
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinua-
tion, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy 
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with 
death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
298A. [Pakistan Penal Code (Second Amendment) Ordinance 
(XLIV of 1980), S. 2] Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect 
of holy personages: 
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representation, or by any imputation, innuendo or insinua-
tion, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of any wife 
(Ummul Mumineen), or members of the family (Ahle-bait), of 
the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), or any of the righteous 
Caliphs (Khulafa-e-Rashideen) or companions (Sahaaba) of 
the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend 
to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Sections 298-B and 298-C of the Penal Code assert that certain minority 
sects—namely the Shiite Ahmadi community—are prohibited from referring 
General Muhammad Zia-ul-
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to themselves as Muslims or using Islamic terminology, names, and practices 
under threat of imprisonment and fines.7 Ahmadis can also be punished if 
they “in any manner whatsoever outrage the religious feelings of Muslims.”8 
Violence Against Minorities 
Zia-ul-Haq’s amendments to the blasphemy laws have legitimized bigotry 
under the guise of safeguarding religion, and have produced conditions 
ideal for the pursuit of vendettas. The laws are inherently flawed for several 
reasons: First, there is no filtering mechanism to prevent individuals from 
misusing the laws, considering only scant evidence is required to convict an 
individual of blasphemy. Second, the laws do not require “a link between an 
offence and the intention, so that even an unintentional act can also be treated 
as a willful one.”9 Consequently, from 1984 onward, the number of blasphemy 
cases, especially against minority groups who bear the brunt of these egregious 
laws, reached more than 5,500.10 To date, the Pakistani court has not executed 
any convicted blasphemer; however, the trajectory of violence against of-
fenders by vigilantes continues to escalate.11 The Pakistani government and 
army, both of which have an historical affinity to Sunni fundamentalism, have 
been utterly apathetic with regard to providing security for the accused.12
Following enactment of the PPC anti-Ahmadi laws amended by Zia-ul-Haq 
in 1984, extremist Muslims unleashed unprecedented levels of violence against 
the Ahmadi community.13 Hatred toward Ahmadis by orthodox Muslims 
derives from the Ahmadi rejection of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) as the 
Khatem-e-Nabuwat (final prophet). Ahmadis claim Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of 
Qadian, India, was the Messiah foretold by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).14 
Declared heretics in Pakistan, Ahmadis have been the “most persecuted 
Muslim religious group,” and a number of Ahmadis accused of blasphemy 
have been murdered by lynch mobs, especially if they were charged with 
claiming to be Muslim.15
Although Shiites are not legally declared to be non-Muslims in the PPC, 
blasphemy laws have perpetuated this sectarian divide, especially for the 
Sunni denomination. Extremist Sunni groups deride Shiites, who revere 
Hazrat Ali as the fourth and final Caliph and reject the Shiite claim that 
Hazrat Ali was the rightful successor to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). 
Within the past decade, fanatical militant Deobandi groups such as 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) have escalated their 
persecution and indiscriminate killings of Pakistani Shiites.16 Targeted 
killings of Shiite scholars, political activists, and young professionals in 
recent years are evidence of the intensifying hatred extremists harbor for the 
sect.17 This trend is reflected in “hate material” found in school curriculums 
throughout Punjab: schoolchildren study chapters that shun and belittle 
religious minorities in Pakistan, as well as all non-Islamist religious groups in 
neighboring India.18 The most nefarious incident to date occurred in February 
2011, when militants seized a bus traveling to Gilgit Baltistan, singled out all 
the Shia passengers, and bludgeoned them to death. The perpetrators have yet 
to be caught because the Pakistani police declared it a cold case and refused to 
investigate further.19 
The U.S. war against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan post-9/11 
not only affected Afghans, but Pakistanis as well. U.S. drone strikes against 
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prohibited from referring to 
themselves as Muslims or 
using Islamic terminology.
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi fighters beheading two 
Pakistanis for being Shia.  Accessed August 
20, 2012 on private Facebook account. 
37
February 2013 
militants suspected of hiding in eastern Pakistan have exacerbated the plight 
of ordinary citizens, especially local Christians, and inflamed anti-Western 
sentiment in Pakistan. Consequently, the blasphemy laws—by default—have 
legitimized vendettas against Pakistani Christians because “Christians in 
Muslim societies are generally affiliated with foreigners, and are regarded by 
many as an extension of Western religious influence.”20 Because Pakistan’s 
religious extremists cannot punish perpetrators outside of the country for 
blasphemous crimes, they unleash their anger on the local Christian popula-
tion. For instance, when in 2011 a Florida pastor organized a Qur’an burning 
ceremony in the United States to commemorate September 11, religious 
extremists in Pakistan responded by killing Pakistani Christians, and vandal-
izing and burning churches.21 
Tensions against local Christians have mounted to the point that in August 
2012, a mentally disabled 11-year old Christian girl was forced to flee from 
her home after allegations surfaced that she had burned Qur’anic scriptures. 
Although the situation diffused when it was discovered that a local imam had 
framed her, other innocent Christians have not been so fortunate.22 In 2009, 
seven Christians falsely accused of burning a Qur’an in Gojra and Korian were 
savagely burned alive by the Taliban-linked group Sipah-e-Sahaba.23 
The most contentious aspect of the blasphemy laws that has directly affected 
Pakistani Christians has been Section 295B: death as punishment for defiling 
the Prophet. Because fundamentalist Muslims believe Christians reject the 
Prophet as the messenger of God, they have used this section of the law to 
“take matters into their own hands, and kill accused blasphemers [and their 
supporters], regardless of official rulings or investigations.”24 Punjab Governor 
Salman Taseer, who spoke out against the blasphemy laws and staunchly 
defended the rights of non-Muslims and dissident Muslims, was shot 26 times 
by his personal security guard, Malik Mumtaz Qadri, for defending Asia Bibi, 
a Christian mother of five sentenced to death by hanging for making what 
were deemed derogatory comments about the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). 
Qadri stated he was “protecting Allah’s religion,” and was subsequently lauded 
for his crime by conservative Islamists who “showered [him] with rose petals” 
upon his arrest.25 As for Asia Bibi herself, Yousuf Qureshi, an imam of the 
Mohabat Khan mosque in Peshawar, announced a reward of U.S. $6,000 for 
anyone who killed her. He publicly declared that if she was acquitted in court, 
the “mujahideen would kill her.”26
Failed Attempts to Repeal the Blasphemy Laws
Despite its severe flaws, the majority of Pakistanis ardently support the blas-
phemy laws and claim the laws deter religious persecution and debasement. 
The reality, however, is that fundamentalist religious groups have drowned 
out—or silenced—the voices of moderates and secularists in Pakistan who 
want the laws either amended or repealed. Several unsuccessful attempts 
have been made at both. In 2001, former President Pervez Musharraf sought 
to repeal the blasphemy laws entirely, but was forced to retract his decision 
after strong opposition from religious groups. In 2010, Sherry Rehman, a PPP 
member, introduced a bill that called for procedural changes to the laws. The 
bill required that blasphemy cases be heard in higher courts, rather than in 
lower courts. Although it reached Parliament, it was struck down once again 
after extremist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) rallied against the bill. 
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Despite being a designated terrorist group, LeT has been at the forefront of 
protests demanding that the status quo for the laws remain, and has garnered 
tremendous support from conservative parties.27 The Pakistani army—histori-
cally aligned with the country’s ideologically conservative groups—has also 
strongly opposed any amendments or calls for repeal of the blasphemy laws, 
thus giving the laws’ extremist proponents a sheen of national legitimacy.
The Pakistani government has given up trying to repeal or amend the laws, 
because, “given the growing religious conservatism in Pakistan, the govern-
ment is wary about losing public support over the issue.”28 The government’s 
inability to repeal or even amend the laws has established a pernicious legal 
precedent, and institutionalized religious intolerance and ethnocentrism in 
the country. This was recently illustrated when former Prime Minister Yousaf 
Raza Gilani stated that the laws would be “undiluted,” despite the murders 
of several secular PPP members who criticized the laws.29 Opposition parties 
such as Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf 
(PTI) have already aligned themselves with religious extremist groups in the 
upcoming 2013 general elections and acquiesced to the latter’s anti-Western 
and pro-conservative rhetoric,30 a decision that has major implications for the 
trajectory of U.S.–Pakistan relations.
A Veneer of Legitimacy for Extremism
Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamic social engineering did much to entrench fanaticism and 
xenophobia in Pakistani society. Now referred to as the “most dangerous place 
in the world,” Pakistan has seen its prospects for social and economic develop-
ment erode as even allies grow wary.31 Other countries such as Afghanistan 
that are divided by religious extremism should learn from Pakistan that 
entrenching a dogmatic ideology could have devastating consequences for 
the country’s future. At this juncture, religious intolerance across the Muslim 
world has reached unprecedented levels. Blasphemy laws only kindle the fire 
of extremism and undermine judicial authority by legitimizing vigilantism. 
Reversing the damage becomes nearly impossible, particularly when insurgent 
groups are deemed the enforcers of the laws.32 Just recently, Hezb-e-Islami 
Gulbuddin (HIG), one of Afghanistan’s most sophisticated insurgent groups, 
claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing carried out by a teenage girl near 
the Kabul airport, which killed twelve people and injured many others. HIG 
stated the attack was in response to clips from an amateur film produced in 
the United States that mocked the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).33 
Recommendations and Conclusion
Freedom of speech in democracies must be an inalienable right, and individuals 
exercising that right should be protected by the government from those who try 
to silence them. Once bigotry has become institutionalized, however, reversing 
it is no easy endeavor, particularly in the face of a volatile opposition force. 
The blasphemy laws in Pakistan are unfortunately so politicized that repealing 
them would cause a volatile backlash by conservatives and simply bolster the 
legitimacy of militant religious groups. The only way this issue can be dealt 
with is to strengthen the role of the judiciary by creating rigid procedural 
rules that will deter abuses and make the complaint process onerous. One 
suggestion would be to require accusers to provide substantial, rather than 
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circumstantial, evidence against alleged blasphemers. To file a complaint, 
the accuser would have to provide proof that the act was premeditated and 
intentional. These strictures ideally would both uphold the presumption of 
innocence and prevent would-be accusers from instigating charges for unin-
tentional acts. 
Blasphemy laws in Pakistan are inherently biased and discriminatory, have 
induced sectarian violence, and have silenced honest political discourse in the 
country. More importantly, the laws run contrary to the spirit of justice and 
respect toward other faiths under the precepts of Islam. Verses in both the 
Qur’an and Hadith (specifically how the Prophet treated other faiths) leave no 
doubt about the importance of religious tolerance and the rights of minori-
ties. Furthermore, according to Islam, forgiveness and preserving the sanctity 
of life are among the most rewarding deeds.34 In the case of Pakistan, the 
blasphemy laws “appease rather than control violent extremists, giving them 
license to continue bullying religious minorities or dissenters.”35 Unfortu-
nately, they also have become the third rail of Pakistani politics, and neither 
the repeal nor amendment of them appears likely anytime soon. 
These laws are having effects beyond the borders of Pakistan.36 For instance, 
the Afghan Taliban could not have become established had it not been for 
the financial, ideological, and logistical support of Pakistan’s radical religious 
parties, such as Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam.37 The Taliban, 
many of whom were taught in Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan but became 
inculcated with the puritanical version of Wahhabi Islam, unleashed unprec-
edented levels of relentless violence against religious minority groups—espe-
cially Hazaras (who are predominantly Shiite)—while they were in control of 
Afghanistan in the 1990s.38 
Although blasphemy laws were not directly responsible for the proliferation 
of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s institutionalization of bigotry and 
extremism—due in part to the implementation of the laws—and their export 
to Afghanistan by the Taliban, make Pakistan partially to blame.39 Following 
9/11, Pervez Musharraf ’s government was put under significant pressure by the 
United States to repudiate the Afghan Taliban. However, that sentiment has 
lately changed. Given the announced 2014 withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan is now considered crucial for securing a peace deal with 
the militant group. This has major implications for whether the Taliban will 
seize control of Afghanistan once again, and reinstate its draconian laws and 
abuses against minorities. Unfortunately, given Pakistan’s continued state-
sanctioned religious intolerance and extremism, Islamabad might just give 
the Afghan Taliban a free pass. The already strained U.S.–Pakistan relations 
are likely only to worsen as Pakistani opposition groups such as PML-N and 
PTI begin to capitalize on the country’s growing radicalization and anti-
Western sentiment in preparation for the 2013 general elections.40  
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Anger or Ability: Arguing the Causes of Rebellion  
History books are so filled with stories of rebellion that it 
would seem that rebellion is a common thing. If we look at history as the flow 
of days and events, for most of those days for the vast majority of humans, 
rebellion has been a very rare thing. This is despite the fact that life for the 
vast majority of people for much of the last 2,000 years was one of unfairness, 
hardship, and repression. According to data from the Quality of Government 
Institute at the University of Gothenburg, in a sample of countries from 
1976 to 2004, the percentage in which political murder, police brutality, and 
unlimited detentions were common was at least 49% of the total sample in 
any given year, and often was much higher than that.1 Nevertheless, in the 
same sample of countries during those years, rebellions or civil wars never 
occurred more than 10% of the time. In other words, many governments treat 
their people very badly, but only on rare occasions do enough people rise up 
to start a full-scale civil war or rebellion. 
On the one hand, this just doesn’t make sense. When my students, most of 
whom are 18 or 19 years old, hear these statistics, they invariably ask me why 
more people don’t revolt against these perpetrators of injustice. Why would 
so many people be willing to be treated like garbage every day and simply 
take it? I remember when I was 14 years of age, reading a horrific story about 
a massacre by government officials in a faraway country. I protested to my 
father that everyone should grab whatever weapon they could and march on 
the capital to overthrow the government. My father, who had grown up in 
a country with a history of dictatorship and occupation, only smiled a little 
sadly and told me I simply did not understand the costs of rebellion. Con-
vinced of my moral rectitude, I proudly responded that I did understand the 
costs and knew I might die, but insisted I would never stand for such treat-
ment without fighting back. My father smiled again and said, “Yes, I agree, I 
am with you. I too would be willing to die for freedom. But I am not willing 
to let you, your brother, your sister, or your mother die for freedom. That is 
the leverage the dictators have over the people.” 
It is no surprise that the vast majority of rebels are young people. From the 
perspective of a parent, the idea of rebellion sounds like a very bad one. As 
one war survivor put it, “However bad [the government] may be, as long as 
you are alive you have a chance, and if you pick up a gun, then you are very 
likely to get dead.” This question of why people sometimes do rebel, the real-
istic opposite of my childish demand to know why people would not, has per-
plexed historians, social scientists, and philosophers over the centuries. What 
would make someone risk it all for a cause that is most likely to fail, and is 
unlikely to bring that person much benefit, even with success? Taking up arms 
is certainly less likely to be beneficial than if he or she simply let someone else 
bear the risk of rebellion, and then shared in the rewards if victory should be 
won. Mark Lichbach refers to this as the “Rebel’s Dilemma,” and suggests that 
the real challenge of rebellion is for the rebel leaders to figure out how to get 
by Victor Asal and Steve Sin 
University at Albany (SUNY)
For the vast majority of 
humans, rebellion has 
been a very rare thing.
“I am willing to die for freedom. 
But I am not willing to let you 
or your mother die. That is 
the leverage dictators have.”
42
CTX | Vol. 3, No. 1
people to do something that on its face makes no rational sense.2 Indeed, it 
makes a heck of a lot more sense to stay as far away as possible.
One major explanation, developed by Ted Robert Gurr, for why some people 
do eventually rebel is called “grievance theory.”3 This theory holds that if 
people are mistreated long enough and badly enough, they will eventually, 
given the chance, take up arms against their oppressors. This argument is 
illustrated in the most painful way possible by a quote from an interview with 
a Chechen teacher after the second Chechen war:
Standing outside her closed school—by order of the Russian com-
mand—she points at the bullet holes that scar the building. “At last 
count, I lost 100 of my children,” she says, adding that during the 
first war, when the Russians entered Samashki during “cleansing 
operations,” they would walk by groups of children and shoot 
at them. “We don’t teach children history,” she continues. “The 
children teach us. I sleep in the same bed with my ten-year-old. He 
says, ‘When I am 13 or 14, just let me go and kill one Russian.’ ”4 
However powerful the grievance argument might be, there are many who 
dismiss it by pointing out that everyone has some kind of grievance, and 
therefore it cannot be the key explanatory factor for why some groups rebel 
and others do not.5 Proponents of grievance theory answer simply that the 
type of grievance matters.6 Not all grievances warrant an uprising. One may 
resent the extravagant privileges of an elite ruling class, but resentment is not 
the same kind of motivation as seeing one’s family slaughtered in an armed 
conflict, or watching one’s children starve because the landowner takes the 
harvest for himself. The Chechen child described above, who is waiting for the 
moment he can pick up a gun to kill his tormentors, does not seem motivated 
by anything else.
In contrast, some scholars point to “greed” as the prime motivator, saying that 
people need an incentive such as the promise of reward before they rebel. In 
this view, greed is used as shorthand for all forms of motivations and incen-
tives, from the simple desire of people to better their situation all the way to 
gaining material wealth and/or position.7 The material aspect of the greed 
argument is based on the logic that rebellions are more likely to happen in 
areas where the rebels will have access to “lootable” resources (e.g., diamonds, 
oil, drugs) by holding and controlling territory. In other words, people will 
participate in a rebellion if they think it can make them rich.8 So, for ex-
ample, one rebel told an interviewer, 
My salary … before entering [the guerilla force] was 8,000 pesos 
a day, and the guerrilla promised me that I would earn between 
300,000 and 400,000 pesos a month … In fact, that is why I 
joined.9
Other scholars reject both the grievance and greed theories, in favor of an 
argument based on resources and opportunity. This is generally known as the 
“opportunity structure” argument.10 We can agree that everyone has a griev-
ance, and perhaps even the motives and incentives to rebel, but only those 
who have a reasonable shot at success are actually going to launch a rebellion. 
Thus, countries in which there are mountains or inaccessible forests where 
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rebels can hold out are much more likely to see people take up arms against 
the government, because these rebels have a place to retreat to, to rest and 
regroup and plan further operations.11 The opportunity structure argument 
actually dovetails very well with the greed argument. For example, areas that 
can easily be defended from government attacks, and that also offer access to 
resources such as diamonds or drug smuggling, are invitations to people to 
band together and challenge government authority.
What do these three theories—grievance, greed, and opportunity struc-
ture—mean for those who have the responsibility to make policy and avoid 
rebellion? Policy makers must not only understand the core grievances of the 
rebels; their motivations (including material incentives); and the political and 
geographical opportunities available to them. Authorities must also be able 
to weigh accurately the relative priorities of these categories for the rebels. 
This means that each situation warrants a careful and rigorous examination to 
define the key factor(s) driving anger and unrest.
Whenever grievances or greed, or some combination of the two, pushes people 
over the edge, it seems clear that those with the resources and the opportunity 
to rebel are also more likely to do so.12 Treating a group badly is a risky move; 
doing so when they can go up to the mountains or retreat to the forest or 
across the border may be more than risky—it is likely to be foolish. 
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ETHICS AND INSIGHTS
Should Former Military Members Maintain Their Military Obligation?1
LCDR J. Andrew Ely, USCGWhen an individual retires or moves to a job with a different 
employer, there may be limits placed upon that individual’s activities in the 
new position. The former employee may be obligated to adhere to a rule that 
limits his or her future employment status. A common example is that of 
federal officials, who are prohibited for a set period of time from working as 
lobbyists with the same federal office in which they previously served. 
This type of limit on what at individual is permitted to do brings up a difficult 
issue for former members of the military. How long after personnel leave the 
military should they maintain their obligation to those still on active duty? 
While serving, soldiers are directed to protect information about specific details 
of their assigned missions. They are trained to understand that the group’s 
security and safety are the responsibility of every member, and that control of 
information is the responsibility of everyone who has access to that information. 
What I want to examine is the obligation that soldiers2 have to one another, and 
whether that obligation can change after an individual leaves the service.
As citizens of a democracy we expect reasonably open access to information. 
The line between the amount of information a democracy requires from its 
government to function, and what the government wants or needs to keep se-
cret, however, is vague and constantly shifting. Too often, secrecy is perceived 
as an excuse to hide malfeasance or ineptitude. If a former soldier believes that 
revealing the truth about a mistake (for example, the Pentagon 
Papers) will strengthen his service and potentially save lives by 
exposing failures, what is his obligation then? Can we identify 
a limit to what former members of the military can disclose as 
bureaucratically as we can define a two-year limit for a former U.S. 
senator to lobby Congress?
Learning from Others’ Experiences
Members of the U.S. and many other militaries enter the profes-
sion willingly. While in the service, their actions are guided by an 
oath, and the individual service’s core values, rules, and regulations. 
Despite these kinds of guidance, the hard lessons of experience in 
the uncertainty of military operations remain a valuable asset to the 
soldier who is executing a current mission or preparing for a future 
one. All human beings have the potential to learn something new 
or better understand something we already know about, through 
the recounted exploits of both real people and the fictional charac-
ters we admire in novels and films. 
Throughout history, soldiers have written moving accounts about 
their military experiences, a tradition that continues today in the 
form of books, articles, and blogs. This practice, I believe, is not 
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only a right of the author; it also provides a great benefit to our current and 
future soldiers, by giving them an opportunity to learn. Through the words 
of those who have been there, we can safely encounter the mistakes of others, 
celebrate the victories won through perseverance and determination, and gain 
a deeper respect for those who paid the ultimate sacrifice.
I use this type of historical account to teach cadets how they might apply 
the Stoic principles put forth by Epictetus in 130 A.D. A memoir by Admiral 
James Stockdale of his time as a POW in Vietnam is an excellent modern 
study of how to accept the things that are not up to us to change, and focus 
our efforts on the things that are up to us. Admiral Stockdale embraced his 
study of Epictetus during his imprisonment, which helped him realize that 
as humans we are fully responsible for the expression of our emotions. This 
and other accounts of 
moral courage, leadership, 
and the ability to make 
decisions in seemingly 
hopeless circumstances 
teach our young soldiers 
lessons that will likely 
influence the outcome of 
missions they undertake 
in the future. Similarly, 
heroic actions such as the 
firefighters’ response to 
the 9/11 attacks influenced 
a generation of children, 
many of whom are my 
students today. Some of 
them tell me that their 
exposure to the horrific 
events more than a decade 
ago led them to dedicate 
their time and talent to 
national service.
It may even be said that 
these accounts of soldiers’ experiences are necessary for the military organiza-
tion to improve. Soldiers need to be able to make sense of the past, to learn 
how those events might affect the missions that they will undertake in the 
future. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated, for example, that the various military, 
law enforcement, and emergency response personnel faced unanticipated 
obstacles trying to communicate with one another. Today, it is readily apparent 
that these same agencies learned from their experiences and have put the 
communication protocols, organizational structures, and equipment in place 
to rectify that breakdown in communication.
The Limits of Freedom
So what is the big deal? Why would I even ask the question:  Should former 
military members maintain their obligation to guard military secrets? While 
I know that the recounting of a soldier’s experiences can be valuable to those 
who serve now or in the future, there is nevertheless a potential for this useful 
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practice to go a step too far, and become destructive to the service. What if a 
former soldier’s writings unveil sensitive information, such as specific details 
about the tactics used to carry out a military maneuver? Publishing informa-
tion like this could jeopardize the lives of soldiers who are still serving on 
active duty and relying on those same tactics. Does a former soldier owe it to 
current soldiers and to his nation not to publish these kinds of details, even at 
personal cost? I believe the answer is yes. More specifically, I believe the former 
soldier’s right to publish is a “bound” right: it is a right that is limited. Such a 
limit is an aspect of the personal sacrifice undertaken by the individual soldier. 
Military service obligates its members in a way that limits the same freedom 
their service is obliged to protect.
If such a limit does in fact exist, what is the basis for it? The oath of service 
taken by both military officers and enlisted personnel states, “that [a soldier] 
will well and faithfully 
discharge the duties of the 
office on which [he or she 
is] about to enter.” In a 
legal sense, one could argue 
that this obligation only 
applies to soldiers while 
they serve on active duty. 
This may be true, but is 
there also a moral obliga-
tion to continue to observe 
the bound rights after 
discharge?  If we agree that 
such a moral obligation ex-
ists for the former soldier, 
we have to understand why 
this is so.
The territory of moral 
obligation is complex, 
because obligation has 
different aspects, requiring greater or lesser degrees of commitment or sacri-
fice. A common concern of the principle of obligation is whether or not an 
individual determines what he or she will commit to. There are three common 
categories of human obligation. First, some obligations we undertake appear 
to be involuntary, that is, they are not self-selected. For example, children do 
not choose their parents, yet when parents give their child life and then raise 
and support her, a special relationship forms. That child feels that she owes 
her parents respect and mutual care in return for the care she has received. 
Then there are the obligations we take on voluntarily, such as choosing to 
participate in a local community effort to clean up a beach over the weekend, 
or observing our wedding vows. We sacrifice a weekend, or a degree of per-
sonal autonomy. Between the voluntary and the involuntary, there is a third 
category of obligation that is partially both. An example of a mixed obligation 
might be a decision to jettison cargo from a ship during a storm. The agent 
voluntarily decides to jettison valuable cargo because he feels obliged to save 
the ship, but it is an involuntary obligation in that the agent does not have a 
useful alternative if the ship, and by extension his own life, are to be saved. He 
These personal obligations 
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sacrifices wealth, perhaps even reputation, 
but these are outweighed by the benefits of 
his decision.
The obligations a person takes on when he 
or she joins the United States military are 
voluntary. To become a soldier involves a 
conscious act of self-selection. Further, un-
like mixed obligations, there is no external 
coercion (excluding personal circumstances 
like an overbearing parent) involved in the 
decision. The initiation of enlistment or 
acceptance of a commission rests exclusively 
with the individual.  
This brings me back to the question about 
former members of the military. I believe 
that not just their obligation to the military, 
but many of their obligations to family 
and society as individuals require them to 
display the moral courage to limit their 
disclosure of sensitive information to the 
public, even when it means subsuming their 
desire for personal vindication or acclaim. 
Furthermore, such disclosure of information 
can violate the former soldier’s other obliga-
tions as a citizen, a member of a family, and 
a friend. These obligations are multi-layered 
and often compete with each other. Impor-
tantly, such obligations are based on inter-
personal relationships. To function well, 
such relationships require mutual trust and 
respect. These personal obligations to others 
are often involuntary; they are often not up 
to us to select, but they are up to us to maintain and preserve. To disseminate 
sensitive information without regard for the consequences is not excusable. It 
potentially endangers those soldiers still on active duty who may rely on the 
security of this information for their safety, in operations that already by their 
very nature pose great risk to their lives. 
NOTES
1 The contents of this article reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed 
by the U.S. Coast Guard Academy or the U.S. Coast Guard.
2 Throughout I will use the term “soldier” as a general term of reference for all members of the 
military services.
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“Our cell against their cell. I like it.” So says FBI agent Max Ca-
nary early on in The Grid, a limited television series that was co-produced by 
Fox and the BBC. Canary’s comment is in response to a National Security 
Council staffer, Maren Jackson, who is seeking to recruit him as she builds her 
own network to fight the network of a rising new terrorist leader, “Muham-
mad.”  What unfolds over the six episodes of the series, which aired in the 
summer of 2004, is a race in which Muhammad and his operatives get their 
terrorist campaign under way—largely by means of hitting at oil and oil 
industry–related targets—while being hunted by the Anglo-American network 
that Maren cobbles together in pursuit of them.
The story is told in something close to documentary style, yet the characters 
are very well delineated, on both sides. Ragib, a medical doctor who once 
patched up Muhammad during the war against the 
Russians in Afghanistan, is a particularly sympathetic 
figure. Conflicted about the very idea of committing 
acts of terror, his attempt to lead a normal life back 
in Egypt is completely upended by Hosni Mubarak’s 
secret police. On the counterterrorist side, Max 
Canary’s motivations clearly come from the loss of one 
of his closest friends in the 9/11 attacks.  He struggles, 
not always successfully, to maintain his professionalism. 
Among the more fascinating elements of the story—for 
me, at least—is the bitter bureaucratic feuding among 
the Americans that makes it so hard to operate in net-
worked fashion. The CIA, FBI, and the National Security 
Council struggle to sort out just who’s in charge, and 
what exactly they’re in charge of. Eventually, the network 
is allowed to emerge, and things really start humming 
when the British representatives of MI5 and MI6 begin 
to demonstrate their formidable capabilities. They are 
portrayed as being more willing to share information 
and to trust their American allies. Together, the Brits 
and Americans begin to put the pieces together and start 
tracking Muhammad’s cells.  
But they aren’t fast enough, and the terrorists get in a 
number of attacks—sometimes mounted against the 
very people who are hunting them, giving the series an 
interesting sense of turnabout.  It seems quite prescient 
of the producers to have come up with a major set of 
terrorist cells operating and intending to strike at targets 
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within the United Kingdom, given that the attacks on the London transporta-
tion system occurred just a year after the series aired.
The climax of the series comes, predictably, as Muhammad’s cells prepare 
a series of strikes even as the counterterrorist forces are closing in on them. 
Without giving away too much, let me just say that the resolution is much 
closer to reality than the usual thriller of this sort: not all of the attacks are 
thwarted, and not all of the terrorists are caught or killed. It is clear that the 
struggle will go on, and the side that prevails will be the one with the more 
effective network.  
Shot on location in the United States, Britain, and Morocco—the last 
substituting for a number of sites in the Middle East and Africa—the series 
has a good cinematic feel. It is exceptionally well cast, particularly with its 
strong female roles on the terrorist-hunting side.  Indeed, the Maren Jackson 
character from The Grid seems clearly to foreshadow Maya, the heroine of the 
counterterror film of the moment, Zero Dark Thirty.
If there is one significant criticism I have of The Grid, it is that the producers 
took a very limited view of networking. The Anglo-American intelligence 
alliance is seen as sufficient, and no doubt kept the writers from having to 
develop too many characters. But they should have figured out a way to bring 
more international elements into the fight against Muhammad and his cells. 
A few years after the series aired, I was approached by the producers and asked 
about what a sequel should look like, and the one big point I tried to get 
across was that they needed to highlight the transnational nature of the fight 
against terrorist networks.  
The sequel has never been made. But the original holds up quite well, and 
is certainly worth making the effort to find online, via Amazon, or by other 
means. The Grid was the first, and to this day remains the best, effort to 
portray a conflict between two networks in which the fundamental dynamic 
is that of hider/finder, and the critical need is to gain greater knowledge 
as swiftly as possible. That the writers and producers at Fox and the BBC 
captured these themes so well, in a series so entertaining, is a tribute to their 
skill and perspicacity. 
NOTES
1 You can buy the DVD from Amazon:  
http://www.amazon.com/The-Grid-Dylan-McDermott/dp/B0006GAO4A 
or download it at: 
http://www.thebox.bz/login.php 
 
Thebox.bz requires you to create a (free) login and download a bit torrent app. Please note 
that while the site appears to be legitimate, CTX does not guarantee the safety or quality of 
the apps or files available on this site.
The producers should 
have figured out a way to 
bring more international 
elements into the fight.
Things really start 
humming when the British 
representatives of MI5 and 
MI6 begin to demonstrate 
their formidable capabilities.
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Much of Europe fell quickly under the shadow of German occu-
pation at the outset of World War II. Starting with small, passive gestures and 
rapidly gaining momentum over the months and years to come, resistance to 
the Nazis formed in every occupied country. At their height, in the months 
leading up to the Allied invasion in 1944, these underground forces numbered 
in the hundreds of thousands: men, women, and children of all ages filling 
a wide range of roles, both direct and supporting, in the cause of freedom. 
Their actions included sabotage, assassination, propaganda, guerrilla warfare, 
intelligence collection, and the operation of escape networks for downed Allied 
aircrews. These efforts tied up German forces, destroyed equipment, killed and 
threatened enemy leaders and soldiers, bled the German supply system, and 
weakened the German troops’ morale. At the same time, the Resistance helped 
to sustain the spirits of those in the occupied countries, and produced valuable 
intelligence for the Allies.  
Two recent European films provide an inside look at two specific Resistance 
movements. The first tells the story of a group of French partisans in Paris, 
while the second portrays the Danish Holger Danske resistance group. Both 
of these films are based on actual events and true historical figures. They 
skillfully represent the detailed inner operations of such organizations, the 
daring and commitment of their members, and the staggering challenges and 
risks these individuals faced throughout the war. Both films are recommended 
viewing for those who wish to learn more about this period of history, or gain 
an appreciation for the realities of clandestine organizations and this realm of 
warfare in general.
L’armée du crime (Army of Crime)
Directed by Robert Guédiguian. France: Studio Canal, 2009; U.S. release 
in 2010. French with English subtitles. 133 minutes. DVD available on 
Amazon.com (price varies); also available to U.S. Netflix subscribers. ASIN: 
B0048FQFI4.
The story of L’armée du crime revolves around the French-Armenian resistance 
leader Missak Manouchian and his organization of French and immigrant 
fighters, many of whom are still memorialized as national heroes in both 
France and their respective countries of origin. Their operations, directed 
against the Nazis and French collaborators in Paris and its environs, included 
bombings directed against German troops, assassinations of key leaders 
(including a Nazi general), dissemination of propaganda, urban guerilla 
warfare, and sabotage. The carefully detailed examples of tradecraft featured 
throughout are fascinating, but the screenplay also vividly portrays the exten-
sive supporting operations that, although often overlooked by historians, are 
just as crucial to effective resistance. This emotionally charged film gives us a 
THE MOVING IMAGE
Two World War II Resistance Films Worth Watching
MAJ Nils J. French, CA
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perspective into the varying motivations of the group’s members, their relation-
ships and internal divisions, their moral dilemmas, and their suffering and loss. 
Actions taken by the authorities to counter the group range from simple 
surveillance to violent reprisals against the general population. Viewers will 
note that those who hunt the insurgents are mostly French, not German, and 
that they often act with little more than a touch of direction from the Nazi 
occupiers. This may come as a bit of an awakening to those less familiar with 
the occupation, who may have thought that the oppression was entirely at the 
hands of the Germans. L’armée du crime makes this important historical point 
quite clear. 
The high quality of the acting and cinematography serve to further enhance 
the story’s inherent drama. Perhaps the most powerful moment comes as the 
film concludes with a staggering tie-in to the real-life history of Manouchian 
and his group. If you have an interest in this remarkable aspect of the war 
against Nazi Germany, you won’t want to miss this film.
Flammen & Citronen (Flame and 
Citron)
Directed by Ole Christian Madsen. 
Denmark: Nimbus Film Productions, 
2009. Danish with English subtitles. 130 
minutes. DVD available on Amazon.com 
(price varies); also available to U.S. Net-
flix subscribers. ASIN: B004GJMW0W.
Flammen & Citronen (Flame and Citron) 
tells the true story of two assassins in 
the Danish resistance: the debonair and 
confident Bent Faurschou-Hviid (Flame) 
and the bitter and scruffy Jørgen Haagen 
Schmith (Citron, “Lemon”). The saga 
is narrated by the character of Bent 
and is generally seen through his eyes. 
Throughout the movie we see the incred-
ible strengths of this odd couple, as well 
as their fundamental human flaws, and 
the personal and moral challenges each 
faces as they work to undermine Den-
mark’s occupiers.
At the outset, Flame and Citron have 
a relatively simple (although difficult) 
role—that of killing Danish collabora-
tors. This quickly becomes complicated, 
however, as their leaders begin to direct 
hits on German officers and civilians, 
which actions may lead to retaliation 
against innocent Danish civilians. The 
The carefully detailed examples 
of tradecraft featured 
throughout are fascinating.
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possibility of a double agent somewhere within the resistance organization 
poses yet another danger.  
One of the profound realities of the underground depicted throughout the 
film is the way in which the duo and their fellow resistance members must 
operate continually under the noses of their Gestapo and Abwehr pur-
suers—in shops, restaurants, bars, and on the streets. This initially is of little 
consequence, as their faces and identities are unknown to the enemy. Here the 
essence of the information advantage is laid bare: we see the far superior forces 
of the Nazis made impotent as the members of the resistance blend perfectly 
with the population. The film gives a real feel for this nerve-wracking dynamic, 
and also shows that the apparent cover it offers can be fragile: the very success 
of the pair soon puts a price on their heads.
Another interesting feature of Flammen & Citronen is its portrayal of the 
resistance organizational structure. We see the chain of command that runs 
from their group to a local leader, to a higher command in Stockholm, and 
eventually to the British Special Operations Executive. We see the manner in 
which this chain directs the operations, 
coordinates support, and disseminates in-
telligence—and the friction that can arise 
along the way. The film also introduces 
the local organization, a crew of men 
and women of all ages and professions: 
a leader, an expert researcher, a member 
who has extensive connections and sells 
information to both sides, a weapons 
expert, a pair of students, a former nun 
with her own resistance cell, and a number 
of others. While the focus is certainly on 
Flame and Citron, we occasionally see the 
workings of the broader group throughout 
the story.  
From an artistic perspective, the film is 
highly cinematic. It begins with carefully 
selected segments of actual war footage 
that lend context to the story, and offers 
many visually rich scenes on location 
in both Copenhagen and Stockholm. 
The acting is superb and the narration is 
skillful, at times almost poetic, as Bent 
leads us through this complicated story.  
From chain-of-command challenges to 
personal dilemmas, and of course edge-
of-your-seat action, Flammen & Citronen 
provides a rare, valuable glance inside 
the complicated and morally challenging 
world of the Danish resistance fighters in 
World War II. 
The film offers many visually 




India has witnessed one of the world’s highest levels of terrorist 
violence in the last three decades, with a unique hybrid of both domestic and 
international terrorism. Two audacious attacks, one on the Indian parliament 
in 2001 and the other in Mumbai in 2008, along with scores of smaller ones 
that have left thousands dead over the past ten years alone, have unsurpris-
ingly brought into question the effectiveness of India’s security and intel-
ligence agencies in counterterrorism. 
While the country’s leadership has been quick to place the blame on the 
intelligence agencies for not providing timely and actionable information, 
however, the official post-mortem analysis in all cases has failed to take a ho-
listic view of the complex issue of CT. The learning curve has, therefore, been 
unimpressive to say the least. Barring a few gap-filler organizational changes, 
corrective action has to this point been piecemeal and incoherent. The 
continued failure of the country as a whole to anticipate and prevent terrorist 
attacks, especially the ones driven by transnational Islamic jihadist ideology, 
has received almost no scholarly attention. The few analyses that are available 
have merely skimmed the surface of the problem by focusing narrowly on 
individual events, and hence failed to address the problem at its core. 
Dr. Prem Mahadevan is a senior researcher at the Center for Strategic Studies 
in Zurich, specializing in the study of intelligence agencies, sub-state con-
flict, and organized crime. In this latest work, Mahadevan manages to delve 
through those many layers surrounding the complex problem of CT in India 
to identify the core problems. He begins by laying out the following hypoth-
esis and alternative hypothesis:
 ¡ CT failures are caused by intelligence failures.
 ¡ CT failures might arise from the poor quality of such intelligence 
instead of poor follow-up on strategic intelligence. 
He disproves the first hypothesis by applying a “four constraints” paradigm 
as it applies to India: lack of political consistency, lack of political consensus, 
lack of operational capacity, and lack of operational coordination. He argues 
that Indian CT policy vacillates between coercive and conciliatory stances on 
a purely ad hoc and reactive basis. Any attempt by the central government 
to mount an offensive strategy has invariably been scuttled due to lack of 
domestic political consensus and international support. State police forces lack 
the operational capacity and capabilities to capitalize on good strategic intel-
ligence with good tactical intelligence. Finally, inter-agency rivalry and the 
absence of a centralized analysis and assessment mechanism at the operational 
level hamper information sharing and cooperation. 
THE  WRITTEN  WORD
The Politics of Counterterrorism in India: Strategic Intelligence and 
National Security in South Asia
GP CPT Srinivas Ganapathiraju, 
IAF
GP CPT Srinivas Ganapathiraju is 
an Indian Air Force fighter pilot.
Author: Prem Mahadevan, 2012 
New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd. 
ISBN: 978-1-84885-775-9 
Hardcover: U.S. $99.00 
297 pages 
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Mahadevan uses three major CT cases within recent Indian experience to 
apply the “four constraints” model, and critically examines the way the Indian 
intelligence apparatuses handled each case. These are 1) the Sikh separatist 
movement in the state of Punjab between 1981 and 1991; 2) the Kashmir 
separatist movement beginning in the early 1990s; and 3) the more recent rise 
of pan-Islamic jihadists. He points out that the security forces’ CT operations 
were successful in one case (the Sikh separatist movement), partially successful 
in another (Kashmir) and utterly unsuccessful in the last (jihadism). This was 
despite the fact that they harbored the same organizational deficiencies across 
time and space, suggesting that the success factor is linked to the willingness 
to act rather than to organization. Consistent political consensus allowed the 
security forces to adopt an offensive stance that ultimately led to a successful 
CT campaign in Punjab. In contrast, waning political consistency and lack of 
consensus prevented the security forces from taking a similarly strong stance 
in the cases of Kashmir and the jihadis, which ultimately resulted in partial 
success in the former case and visible failure in the latter. 
Disproving the alternative hypothesis as well, Mahadevan concludes on the 
basis of India’s CT experience that the action the security services take on 
strategic intelligence is more important than the quality of the intelligence 
itself. Without discounting organizational deficiencies, Mahadevan connects 
them as contributors to the lack of operational capacity among the intelligence 
agencies. He attributes the cascade of CT failures to the decision makers’ in-
ability to develop strategic intelligence into tactical intelligence through timely 
follow-up action, a symptom of low operational capacity combined with poor 
coordination. Highlighting the differences between these two types of intel-
ligence, he challenges the dominant presumption that CT failures are caused 
solely by organizational weaknesses within intelligence agencies, and attempts 
instead to draw researchers’ attention to the problem of why decision makers 
fail to act on the generic warnings they do receive. 
In his conclusions and reflections, Mahadevan recommends a two-pronged 
approach for India as it works to counter violent Islamic jihadism. First, he 
calls on the country to implement a series of domestic security reforms that 
were supposed to follow from the lessons of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. He 
further suggests that India take offensive CT measures inside Pakistan itself, 
intended primarily as a deterrent to Pakistan’s ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) 
and Pakistani jihadists. 
Eloquently written, the book is well researched and stands apart from many 
government commissions of enquiry for its holistic approach to the complex 
subject of CT. The book is a must read for practitioners of CT at all levels who 
wish to understand its complexity, especially in the political environment of a 
vibrant, multi-ethnic democracy like India. At just over 200 pages, the book is 
a quick read and worth the price. A must have for all libraries. 
 Indian CT policy vacillates 
between coercive and 
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The 9/11 Memorial website, set up to accompany the long-awaited 
Freedom Tower complex in lower Manhattan, reflects a longing for closure 
to an event that most Americans cannot seem to let go.1 The primary func-
tion of the website, with the five subsections Planning your Visit, Memorial, 
Museum, Teach+Learn, and Donate+Get Involved, is to help the public chew 
and digest the incomprehensible manifestation of a phantom menace that was 
9/11; to this end, the site, like the Freedom Tower, nevertheless falls just shy of 
making any definitive statements. Rather, it seeks to promote healing through 
participatory personal story-telling, along with mythologizing about the day 
of the event itself. 
The section of the site titled “Education Goals,” under the main heading 
Teach+Learn, comes closest to a direct confrontation with the attack’s perpe-
trators. It warns that discussing 9/11 may “trigger strong and even unfamiliar 
feelings,” in oddly bland terms that echo the safety-conscious civil law reforms 
of the 1990s, as in, “Caution, beverage may be hot.” Although its stated goal is 
the education of late middle and high school students, the text then proceeds 
to acknowledge both the “unfinished nature of the story” and its “continuing 
ambiguities.” One wonders, what is the purpose of beginning a painful con-
versation with the assumption that a conclusion, and thus a sense of closure, is 
impossible to achieve? 
The text bounces between obvious sentiments like, “The scale of death and de-
struction that resulted from 9/11 made Americans feel vulnerable in ways that 
were new and unfamiliar,” and ambiguous questioning that leave definitions 
and answers up to the imagination: “Acts of terrorism reinforce awareness of 
communities of difference, heightening a sense of ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ How can 
we resist the impulse to view other people stereotypically or as monolithic 
‘others’? How can we balance appropriate caution with curiosity about other 
communities and respect for diversity?” 
The reader is left wondering what a “community of difference” might be, 
and whether we are being directed to define and explore unfamiliar groups of 
people—or to avoid acknowledging their existence at all. This line of ques-
tioning would suggest the latter is preferable: as long as we are able to politely 
sweep differences under the rug, we should do so. The ostensibly educational 
discussion for young teens invokes terms like “others” in a sort of pop-aca-
demic context, suggesting that the site includes its junior audience as an excuse 
for its feebleness in addressing the burning questions of an adult audience.2
The questioning then plunges into contradiction, teetering between the com-
plete denial and the complete acceptance of “others:” “We are taught to respect 
differences, but how should we react to groups whose views are fundamentally 
antithetical to our own values and ideals? How do we deal with communities 
STATE OF THE ARTS
Reflections on the 9/11 Memorial
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of hate?”3 Here the reader discovers a new community, the equally undefined 
but highly polarized “community of hate,” to go along with the “community 
of difference.” In both cases, the questions of what constitutes these “com-
munities” and how we should deal with them are left to dangle. The website’s 
rhetoric, echoed in the architecture of the Freedom Tower and the Memo-
rial structure itself, is, quite naturally, primarily concerned with America’s 
self-image, including healing and issues like diversity and security. But it is 
precisely from this self-image, and not necessarily the reality of the cataclysm 
around which the debate centers, that the source of ambiguity stems. 
The site shows that what is missing from the history-writing, or “historicizing,” 
of the events of 9/11 is an examination of the attacks from the standpoint of 
the private citizen, as opposed to the government. This is what philosopher 
Jacques Rancière was talking about when he said there appeared to be no 
symbolic break, no conscious distinction, between American culture and 
identity and American foreign policy (represented by the White House), or 
American global financial power (represented by the Trade Towers). Instead 
of distinguishing between the citizen and the government, and taking a close 
look at the dynamics of global politics and the use of terrorism all over the 
world today, the broad American reaction was to become more introverted, 
and more dependent on governmental authority. The familiar tug-of-war 
between constitutional freedom and personal security shifted strongly in the 
latter’s direction after 9/11. 
As the Memorial pilgrim becomes lost in self-examination, al Qaeda fades to 
the horizon. Missing in the Memorial and new Tower is the true iconography 
of the previous site. The World Trade Center, the symbol of global finance, 
American world power by way of monetary and military hegemony, is now 
the Freedom Tower. The freedom, perhaps, of the free market now, since it 
is still a financial center. Yet nowhere is there a discussion of economic and 
political globalization relevant to the Trade Center’s creation and, arguably, its 
demise. The construction of the tower’s meaning is more nostalgic, ephemeral, 
metaphysical. It is as if the old towers, once the architectural embodiment 
of the market institution of global financial power, have, in their apparent 
martyrdom, been graced with a sublime aura they did not previously possess. 
Photographs, presented in a way to evoke nostalgic film slides, show a couple 
embracing in one frame and graffiti that reads, “fuck Osama” in another, both 
treated with the same tenderness and respect: the decompartmentalization of 
emotion under the discipline of an overall righteous aesthetic.4 In the time and 
space of 9/11, as a discreet moment in history, all American feelings of victim-
hood, loss, and anger were just and true.
The pervading lesson expounded by U.S. political leaders about 9/11 was that 
this was a reason for American solidarity and a vindication of American ideals. 
Al Qaeda was the perfect metaphor for evil’s hatred of American goodness. 
Thus the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts were initially framed in terms of the 
Second World War. 9/11 was analogous to Pearl Harbor. Saddam Hussein and 
bin Laden embodied the same pure evil as Hitler and Stalin. The United States 
was once again the victim and the savior, rising in righteous anger.
The website’s rhetoric is, quite 
naturally, primarily concerned 
with America’s self-image.
It is as if the old towers have, 
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But the terrorist conflict is not as clean as the nation-state conflict appeared 
to be. Terrorists exist in a kind of liminal zone outside convention and law, 
manifested in the vague handling of Guantánamo prisoners: Where should 
they be tried, what should they be called? Hence the note of caution and of 
nostalgia in the memorialization of the Trade Towers. Hence the introversion 
of the narrative. Finally, Americans are not sure who these anti-American 
people are or what to do about them. They are inexplicable and exasperating, 
and yet they also conveniently fill the vacant role once played by the Soviet 
Union of necessary antithesis, against whom in contrast American rectitude 
is reified. 
Even this, however, is too shallow a conclusion. Al Qaeda’s intended sym-
bolism in targeting American global finance by attacking the Trade Towers (as 
opposed to, say, crowded Disney World or hedonist Las Vegas) was apparently 
completely lost or disregarded in constructing the national 9/11 narrative. 
Terrorism is a political act. Bin Laden and his gang, enemies of the Islamic 
Saudi regime that Washington supports, had a gripe with U.S. activities in the 
Gulf. 9/11 was the ugly face of geo-political terrorism of the type many nations 
have been facing for years. Acts of terrorism are a harsh reality of the global-
ized age we live in, not the spiritual clash between good and evil manifesting 
on U.S. soil. Until Americans can cast aside the mythologized version of the 
War on Terror as the good fight against random acts of evil by “communities 
of hate,” our strategy will continue to rely on American exceptionalism as a 
key tenet and blind us to our own global vulnerabilities and geo-economic 
context. Al Qaeda’s successful attack should be seen neither as the harbinger 
of a great clash of civilizations nor as an isolated act of insanity and hatred. 
Rather, al Qaeda’s violence on 9/11 was motivated, much like Unabomber Ted 
Kazinski’s, by frustration with U.S. cultural and economic hegemony. A more 
relevant question is, how would we like to deal with that? Seeking the answer 
might make a realistic discussion possible. 
Al Qaeda’s attack was neither 
the harbinger of a great 
clash of civilizations nor an 
isolated act of hatred.
1 The website is at http://www.911memorial.org
2 Edward Said is best known for describing the endemic racism 
in Middle East/Islamic scholarship by Western academics in his 
1987 book Orientalism. In this text, Said frequently referred 
to modern psychoanalyst Jacques Luis Lacan’s use of the term 
“Other” to define that which is seen as radically apart or different 
from the self. By setting “others” apart and using the word in 
conjunction with “monolithic,” the website’s authors are making 




4 These were part of a series of photographs published by 
Getty Images to mark the one-year anniversary of bin Laden’s 
death and the Freedom Tower’s climb to an equal plane with 
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Afghanistan in Transition Beyond 2014? 
Afghanistan in Transition 
Beyond 2014? 
Shanthie Mariet D`Souza (ed.) 
ISBN: 978-81-8274-674-9 
Publication Year: 2012 
Pages: 264 
Price: US$ 39
Afghanistan is at a cusp of “change.” As 2014, the date for the drawdown of 
international forces draws near, the international community is confounded 
by the complexities of an effective inteqal (transition) as by the modalities for 
ensuring it.
This book brings together varied Afghan voices to set the agenda, address 
critical gaps in the ongoing inteqal process, 2012–14 and suggest alternate 
courses of action by setting a forward looking agenda, beyond 2014. The 
strength of this volume stems from the rich contributions by experts and 
practitioners from the field, providing an in-depth analysis of the perceptions, 
needs, and preparedness on the ground.
The common thread that runs through all the chapters of the book is that the 
inteqal process needs to be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. This book provides 
diverse perspectives from a number of Afghans, offering a realistic assessment 
of the achievements and challenges in building local capacities and institutions 
in key sectors—security, political, governmental, and economic. These will 
form the basis of future progress.
Chapters on regional perspectives and also the U.S. perspective provide 
important insights into the role of external players in the present imbroglio. 
This book is a valuable and timely contribution to the academic and policy 
discourse on the prospects for effective transition and long-term stabilization 
in Afghanistan.
Dr. Shanthie Mariet D`Souza is a research fellow at the Institute of South 
Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. She was previously an 
associate fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi; 
and a Fulbright Scholar of South Asia Studies, The Paul H. Nitze School of 
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C. 
Dr. D`Souza has published extensively in journals, edited volumes, and other 
media. Her research interests and expertise include the regional dynamics of 
the Afghan insurgency and the counterinsurgency campaign; transition and 
long-term stabilization in Afghanistan; and counterterrorism in South Asia. 
She has conducted field studies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir 
and India`s Northeast. 
59
February 2013 
Iran: Illusion, Reality, and Interests 
by Roby C. Barrett 
Issue Date: September 2012
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has perhaps been the United States’ 
most intractable foreign policy issue. Dr. Roby Barrett provides a deep analysis 
of Iran’s motivations and finds that they are not the result of irrational messi-
anic religious thought, but rather are based on a rational worldview developed 
over centuries of history. Looking back over the course of that history, Barrett 
shows the reader how a strong sense of victimization and humiliation, rooted 
in Persia’s loss of its historical preeminence in the Gulf, shapes the Iranian 
psyche. He suggests that their elected president holds little actual power. 
The Iranian constitution vests the highest political and religious authority 
in the Supreme Leader; this includes the power to declare war and dismiss 
the president. As such, the United States must be prepared to deal with the 
complexities of the entire regime, not just the presidency.  
Irregular Warfare: The Maoist Challenge to India’s Internal Security  
by Prakash Singh 
Issue Date: December 2012
Mr. Prakash Singh’s monograph on the Maoist movement in India benefits 
from his unique perspective as a distinguished police officer in some of the 
country’s most turbulent regions. He provides a detailed history of insurgency 
in India, including the history of uprisings starting from the Telengana 
insurrection of the mid-to-late 1940s to the Communist movement, sponsored 
by Mao Zedong’s China. Mr. Singh traces the transition of the peasant-led 
Naxalite movement, with its roots in a single village in West Bengal, to the 
Communist Party of India (Maoist) Movement, which has spread to some 20 
of India’s 28 states. India’s prime minister has declared more than once that the 
Maoist challenge is the biggest threat to the internal security of the country. 
How India accommodates its tribal minorities and reaches an accommodation 
with insurgents is a critical element for long-term regional stability. 
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